ȃȇȇ Partʺʺ: Politics and Philosophy
Ļe contractarians overlook a vital distinction: What is undesirable in
such a case is not necessarily the policy itself but rather its imposition by
antidemocratic means. It is not necessarily inconsistent or antidemocratic
or elitist for an economist or social philosopher, while deploring imposi-
tion of the policy, to continue advocating it and trying to explain its virtues.
In short, the nihilistic relativism of the contractarians is by no means the
only alternative to a repulsive authoritarianism.
ŏśŚŠŞōŏŠōŞŕōŚ džŏŠŕśŚş
Contractarians understand, of course, that specific policy measures can-
not in practice be enacted only with unanimous consent. Ļey therefore
try to find constitutional authority for non-unanimous enactments. Ļe
constitution need not necessarily be a written document; it may consist of
the fundamental features of the existing society. Ļat broad constitution
is deemed to command substantially unanimous consent by virtue of its
actual existence and people’s living under it. (See, for example, Buchanan
and TullockȀȈȅȁ, pp.ȁȄȃ,ȁȅǿ–ȁȅȀ.) Yet David Hume had long before
mocked such notions of passive, tacit consent with his much-quoted exam-
ple of the shanghaied sailor who, merely by refraining from jumping
overboard, does not thereby consent to the captain’s supposed author-
ity over him (“Of the Original Contract,” reprinted in HumeȀȆȄȁ/ȀȈȅȄ,
p.ȁȅȂ).
Buchanan and Tullock (ȀȈȅȁ, pp.ȁȅǿ–ȁȅȀ) conceived of the “social con-
tract” as
a dynamic one.... We do not conceive the “constitution” as having been
established once and for all. We conceive the contractual aspects to be
continuous, and the existence of a set of organizational rules is assumed
to embody consensus. We think of the individual as engaging contin-
uously both in everyday operational decisions within the confines of
established organizational rules and in choices concerned with changes
in the rules themselves, that is, constitutional choices. Ļe implicit
rule for securing the adoption of changes in these organizational rules
(changes in the structure of the social contract) must be that of una-
nimity. Ļis is because only through the securing of unanimity can
any change be judged desirable on the acceptance of the individualistic
ethic.In later writings Buchanan also treats a supposed implicit social con-
tract as if it had actual force. He refers (ȀȈȆȄa, p.Ȉȅ) to the “existing and