is misleading. The word is most at home in Christianity. Jews, Muslims, Hindus,
Buddhists, and others often do not think of their serious religious reflection as
theology (Ford 2005: 73–76). Moreover, in some parts of the world ‘theology’
primarily denotes the activity of people who work in a certain academic context,
namely, Christian theologians who teach in universities or other institutions of
higher learning. So let me clarify that I am using the word ‘theology’ as a
metonym. It stands for any religious claim advanced for serious intellectual
consideration, regardless of the religious tradition to which the person making
the claim belongs, regardless of whether the person identifies herself as religious
or only as ‘spiritual’, and regardless of whether that reflection occurs in the
context of a widely recognized religion or a new—or ‘ancient’—practice like
neo-shamanism or Wicca.
7 Others may differ. For example, like Ian Stevenson (1987, 1997, 2003), they
may try to prove the veracity of certain religious claims. Since time and energy
are scarce resources, everyone needs to assess the possibility of success in pursuing
all sorts of claims; creation science and Holocaust denial are extreme examples.
In academics as in other areas of life, where some see an opportunity for entre-
preneurship, others see a waste of resources.
8 PacePaul Griffiths (2006a, 2006b). Although I find it hard to make any sense
of Griffiths’ claim that ‘religion’ is a natural kind—the word certainly does not
seem to behave like other natural-kind words—I would agree that the study of
religions rests, as does all human knowledge, upon axioms. I doubt, however,
that axioms pertaining to, for example, the existence of the planet earth ‘are of
the same order of abstraction and disputability as those assumed by (for instance)
Catholic systematicians’ (2006b: 77). Although I think there are possible worlds
in which these axioms might be of the same order, the world in which we live
does not seem to be of that sort.
9 Ryba cites Newman in accusing those who would exclude theology from
institutions of knowledge, such as universities, of intellectual arrogance.
Unfortunately, this argument cuts much too wide, for it can be used to argue
for the inclusion of astrology in astronomy, yogic subtle channels in medicine,
and intelligent design in biology.
10 I tend to agree with Strenski (2006), when he argues against McCutcheon (2001)
that scholars of religions are to be neither caretakers nor ‘undertakers’ (what
McCutcheon calls ‘critics’) of religion. In other words, rather than seeking to
foster religion or destroy it, scholars of religions are to remain neutral toward
it. In the end, however, even this statement claims too much. As an empirical
enterprise, the study of religions should not—and cannot legitimately—determine
a priori whether its conclusions benefit religion, work to its detriment, or are
inconsequential to religious practice and commitment. That is a result that can
be determined only after the fact and on a case by case basis. Similar hesitations
can be expressed about the terms ‘methodological agnosticism’ and ‘metho-
dological atheism’. For example, if—mirabile dictu—the last judgment as foretold
in the Qur’ån began indisputably to occur, it would make little sense for scholars
of religions to invoke a principled methodological agnosticism or atheism as
justification for refusing to take this event into account.
11 For more up to date accounts, see, e.g. Nye 2003; Antes, Geertz, and Warne
(eds) 2004; Hinnells (ed.) 2005.
1111
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1011
1
2
3111
4 5 6 7 8 9
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
30111
1
2
3
4
35
6
7
8
9
40111
42222
3
411
INTRODUCTION
11
