deep freedom 333Pluralistic strategic coordination and cooperative competition in
turn prefi gure innovations in the institutional arrangements of the
market economy— innovations designed to make more innovation pos-
sible. Th e integrity and the effi cacy of such a scheme of prospective in-
citement require that it be followed by a radicalization of competitive
selection. Th e institutional innovations that serve the arousal before the
fact then become part of the institutional setting of market competition
aft er the fact. It is a connection reenacting in material life the experi-
ence of innovation in thought.
From such innovations in the arrangements governing the relation
between governments and fi rms there can arise in turn alternative re-
gimes of contract and property. Each such regime organizes decentral-
ized access to the resources of production and to the opportunities of
economic initiative in a diff erent way. Each strikes in diff erent form the
balance between giving voice to multiple stakeholders in par tic u lar
productive resources and ensuring the power of entrepreneurs to bet
their stake against dominant opinion. Variation will increase within
national economies as well as among them. More people will then be
more likely to have more access to more markets, capabilities, and capi-
tal in more ways. Diversity, in or ga ni za tion as well as in experience and
perspective, will serve as an incitement to fecundity. Because scale will
be achieved, for the same reasons and in the same manner, in many
diff erent ways rather than only in ways that place the power to direct
capital in a small number of hands, competition can more easily be
sharpened without imperiling scale. What the fervor creates the com-
petition will judge.
A similar combination between prospective provocations to invent
and retrospective procedures to select can and should be established in
t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f d e m o c r a t i c p o l i t i c s a s w e l l a s i n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f
civil society. Th e po liti cal and social forms of such a combination are,
however, less obvious, and more subtle, than its economic ones.
Th e constitutional arrangements of a high- energy democracy must
favor the creation of a broad range of experiments: for example, by al-
lowing par tic u lar places and sectors to create counter- models of the
national future (the radicalization of the experimental uses of federal-
ism). Yet the power of governments and electorates to overcome im-
passe and to choose, in the light of such experiments, a way forward