becoming more human by becoming more godlike 417
ments; others, to prophecies. A premise of the religion of the future,
made explicit in its move against mummifi cation, is that the or ga ni za-
tion of society and of belief can either settle for less life or make more
life possible.
Another pre- philosophical attitude emphasizes the most simple of
ideals: keep out of trouble. Th e best way to keep out of trouble is to stay
at home. Home is our limited circumstance, of life and thought, in all
its forms. We would suff er much less, and impose much less suff ering
on others— Voltaire advised— if only we ceased to conceive vainglori-
ous adventures. Such adventures are the large transformative enter-
prises of politics and thought. Th ey are also the restless striving of the
individual for more of anything that others desire, or for some illusory
good fabricated in the imagination. Th e refusal of mummifi cation, how-
ever, begins in the disposition to look for trouble. Unless we look for
trouble, we cannot come into the fuller possession of life.
Next on the list of the approaches to existence that weaken our re-
solve to resist the sacrifi ce of life to the mummy come the diff erent ver-
sions of the theoretical altruism that inspires much of modern moral
philosophy, secularizing and trivializing the road to salvation marked
out by the Semitic mono the isms. One version of this theoretical altru-
ism tells us to seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number. We are
to do so either according to circumstantial judgments, unconstrained
by stable rules, or according to rules that we evaluate and revise ac-
cording to a felicifi c or welfare calculus. A second version instructs us
to act according to rules that we have reason to make universal. Th e
universality of the rules enables us to overcome our partiality of view,
tainted by interest and appetite, and to treat others, disinterestedly, as
ends in themselves. A third version, barely distinct from the second,
advises us to adopt those rules and practices to which we would have
reason to consent in a circumstance undistorted by ignorance, subjuga-
tion, or self- interest. In such a circumstance, magnanimity can be puri-
fi ed and guided by rational deliberation.
All these versions of the theoretical altruism tend to the same empti-
ness: they give form to a content that they are powerless to create and
that they must import from outside. Th ey misrepresent the fundamen-
tal problem of our relation to others, which is our need to connect and
to engage without the surrender and subjugation of the self, rather than