Pearson Edexcel Level 3 Advanced GCE in Religious Studies – Anthology
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Upanishadic ethics
The Upanishads (post 500 BCE), perhaps the key philosophic al texts of the
Hindus, presuppose in princ iple t he aut horit y of t he earlier Vedas (while being
c ynic al regarding Vedic rit ualism wit h it s promises for ut ilit arian ret urns, suc h as
cows and progeny), however, develop this alternative sc heme with muc h finesse for
a more universal applic at ion. Here met aphysic al knowledge is plac ed above worldly
pursuit s. But t his sc heme also allows for t he possibilit y of, indeed enc ourages, a
detached and asocial pursuit of spiritual ends removed from the c hallenges of the
world.
That this tendenc y develops in the hands of yogis and asc etic s, and that it
influenc es Indian ethic al thinking c annot be denied. It appears almost as though
dharma c ould be dispensed with. As the virtuoso Yajnavalkya, justifying his hasty
dec ision to leave behind his wealth, home and two wives, puts it: It is not for the
sake of the husband, wife, sons, wealth, gods, Vedas, brahminhood, kshatriyahood,
etc, that these are dear, but for the sake of the Self, all these are the Self, one
knows all in the Self... Work c annot inc rease nor diminish the greatness of this
knowledge (Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 5.5.6–7; 4.4.24). Virtue is deemed
nec essary for knowledge, and the Soc ratic dic tum, ‘knowledge is virtue’ rings
through here also. The ideal Upanishadic person is expected to overcome emotions,
feelings, inc linations and sentiments in pursuit of a higher, nonetheless self-
centred, ‘calling’. But there are few rules.
It is, however, just for these sorts of reason that there have been charges,
from within and without the tradition, that all we have here is an ethic ally bankrupt,
quiet ist ic and myst ic ally-grounded morality (Danto, 1972, p. 99). At least this is
what is said of the Vedanta and Yoga systems.
True as this c harge might be, there is a list of three comprehensive virtues
ext olled in t he Upanishads (and familiar t o readers of T. S. Eliot ) whic h is wort hy of
mention, namely, ‘damyata, datta, dayadhvam’, signifying, self -rest raint , giving or
self-sacrifice, and compassion. But again, there are no rules other than exemplars,
and no virt ues t o worry about aft er at t aining liberat ion. St ill, one moral ramific at ion
of t he Upanishadic worldview is t hat all life, as indeed t he whole world, is t o be
looked upon as a whole, where the ego sets aside its own narrow self-interests and
even effaces itself.
Smarta ethics
There occur parallel and subsequent developments among the more doctrinaire
and legalistic advocates of the rule of dharma, in what we shall call smarta
(derivative) ethics. The sc hool of Mimamsa c hampions a rigidly c at egoric al reading
of t he sc ript ural imperat ives. T he implic at ion is t hat all dut ies— religious as well as
sec ular — c ould be divided into those that are optional or prudential and those that
are obligatory, and that all ensuing ac tions are instrumental towards some result or
end (even if not indicated). But if there is a mandate one does it out of a sense of
obligation. The Mimamsa developed the thorough going hermeneutic of dharma for
whic h the sc hool is best known, and whic h proved instruc tive for later ethic al and
legal disc ourses.