126 Psychodynamic Models of Personality
people have only limited introspective access to these under-
lying causes, they have only limited control over these
processes as well. In part as a consequence of their emphasis
on unconscious processes, psychodynamic theorists are unan-
imous in positing that a certain degree of self-deception is
characteristic of both normal and abnormal functioning: Not
knowing why we are driven to behave in a certain way, but
needing to explain our behavior to ourselves, we generate
explanations that may or may not have anything to do with the
real causes of behavior (e.g., see Bornstein, 1999b). More-
over, when feelings, thoughts, and motivations produce anxi-
ety (including guilt), we invoke coping strategies calledego
defensesto minimize these negative reactions and to hide
them from ourselves (Cramer, 2000).
The once-radical notion of defensive self-deception is
now widely accepted among psychoanalytic and nonpsycho-
analytic psychologists alike. Research in social cognition
(attribution theory in particular) confirms that systematic, pre-
dictable distortions in our perceptions of self and others are a
normal part of everyday life (Kihlstrom, 1987; Robins & John,
1997). Although the language of attribution theory differs
substantially from that of psychoanalysis, scrutiny reveals a
remarkable degree of convergence between these two frame-
works. Moreover, researchers have begun to bridge the gap be-
tween these ostensibly divergent theoretical perspectives,
uncovering a surprising degree of overlap in the process.
One area in which psychodynamic models of defensive
self-deception diverge from social psychological models of
this phenomenon is in the explanations of why these distor-
tions occur. Although both models agree that these distortions
stem largely (but not entirely) from self-protective processes,
only psychoanalytic theories explicitly link these distor-
tions to an identifiable set of unconsciously determined strate-
gies termed ego defenses. Social cognitive researchers have
tended to favor explanatory models that emphasize limitations
in the human information-processing apparatus and mental
shortcuts that arise from the need to process multiple sources
of information simultaneously as key factors in our cognitive
biases and distortions of self and others (Robins & John,
1997). Recent work in terror management theory represents a
potential bridge between psychodynamic and social-cognitive
work in this area, insofar as the terror management theory
model specifies how distortions in inter- and intrapersonal
perception simultaneously reflect defensive processes and
information-processing limitations (Pyszczynski, Greenberg,
& Solomon, 1999).
Ironically, the concept of the ego defense—now central to
psychodynamic models of personality—did not receive much
attention during the theory’s formative years. In fact, Janet
paid greater attention to the defense concept than Freud did
(Perry & Laurence, 1984), and in certain respects Janet’s po-
sition regarding this issue has turned out to be more accurate
than Freud’s has (see Bowers & Meichenbaum, 1984). Evi-
dence suggests that a conceptualization of defensive activity
as narrowing of consciousness may be more valid and heuris-
tic than is the classic psychoanalytic conceptualization of de-
fense in terms of exclusion (orbarring) of material from
consciousness (Cramer, 2000; cf. Erdelyi, 1985).
Although Freud discussed certain ego defenses (e.g., re-
pression, projection, sublimation) in his theoretical and clini-
cal writings, it was not until Anna Freud’s (1936) publication
ofThe Ego and the Mechanisms of Defensethat any effort was
made to create a systematic, comprehensive listing of these
defensive strategies. Most of the ego defenses discussed by A.
Freud continue to be discussed today, although some have
fallen out of favor, and new ones have been added as empiri-
cal research on defenses began to appear following A. Freud’s
(1936) seminal work.
In the decades following A. Freud’s (1936) publication,
several alternative methods for conceptualizing ego defenses
were offered. The most influential of these are summarized in
Table 5.4. As Table 5.4 shows, differences among the individ-
ual defense, defense style, and defense cluster models have
less to do with the way that specific defensive processes are
conceptualized and more to do with how these processes
are organized and relate to one another. Each approach to
conceptualizing and organizing ego defenses has its own as-
sociated measurement strategy (technique), its own research
base, and its own adherents within the discipline.
The combined influences of unconscious processes and ego
defenses raise the unavoidable question of whether within theTABLE 5.4 Perspectives on Ego Defenses
Perspective Key Contributors Key Terms
Individual S. Freud, A. Freud Specific defenses:
defenses Repression
Projection
Denial
Sublimation
Displacement
Defense style Ihilevich & Gleser Defense styles:
approach Reversal
Projection
Principalization
Turning against object
Turning against self
Defense Vaillant Defense levels-clusters:
levels-clusters Adaptive-mature
Maladaptive-immature
Image distorting
Self-sacrificing
Note. Detailed discussions of these three perspectives are provided by
Cramer (2000), Ihilevich & Gleser (1986, 1991), and Vaillant (1986).