The State of Theory in the Field of Personality 141the various personality theories in order to improve the the-
ory level of the field. They are not theorists in the sense that
they study their field and pick out its weaknesses and errors
in order to advance the field. They do not analyze the con-
cepts and principles in different theories in order to bring
order into the chaos of unrelated knowledge. They do not, for
example, work on the large task of weaving the theories to-
gether into one or more larger, more advanced, and more gen-
eral and unified theories that can then be tested empirically
and advanced.
An indication of the mixed-up character of the field of per-
sonality theory is the inclusion of Skinner’s experimental
analysis of behavior as a personality theory in some textbooks
on personality theory. This is anomalous because Skinner has
rejected the concept of personality, has never treated the phe-
nomena of personality, has had no program for doing so, and
his program guides those who are radical behaviorists to ig-
nore the fields of personality and its measurement. His find-
ings concerning schedules of reinforcement are not used by
personologists, nor are his students’ findings using the experi-
mental analysis of behavior with human subjects nor his phi-
losophy-methodology of science. His approach appears to be
quite irrelevant for the field. What does it say about the field’s
understanding of theory that the irrelevance of his theory does
not matter? From the standpoint of the philosophy and
methodology of PB, the field of personality is in a very primi-
tive state as a science.
To some extent the following sections put the cart before
the horse because I discuss some theory needs of the field of
personality before I describe the approach that projects those
needs. That approach involves two aspects: a particular the-
ory and a philosophy-methodology. The latter is the basis for
the projections made in this section. This topic needs to be
developed into a full-length treatment rather than the present
abbreviation.
The Need for Theorists Who Work the Field
One of the things that reveals that the field of personality the-
ory is not really part of a fully developed science is the lack of
systematic treatment of the theories in the field. Many study
the theories of the field and their empirical products. But that
study treats the field as composed of different and indepen-
dent bodies of knowledge to be learned. There is not even the
level of integration of study that one would find in humanities,
such as English literature and history, where there is much
comparative evaluating of the characteristics of different
authors’ works.
If the field of personality theory is to become a real scien-
tific study, we need theorists whoworkthe field. Theories have
certain characteristics. They contain concepts and principles,
and the theories deal with or derive from certain empirical data.
And those concepts, principles, and data vary in types and in
functions. With those differences, theories differ in method and
content and therefore in what they can do and thus how they fit
together or not. We need theorists who study such things and
provide knowledge concerning the makeup of our field. What
can we know about the field without such analysis?
We need theorists who work the field in other ways also.
For example, two scientific fields could be at the same level in
terms of scientific methods and products. One field, however,
could be broken up by having many different theorists, each of
whom addresses limited phenomena and does so in idiosyn-
cratic theory language, with no rules relating the many theo-
ries. This has resulted in competing theories, much overlap
among theories and the phenomena they address, and much
redundancy in concepts and principles mixed in with real dif-
ferences. This yields an unorganized, divided body of knowl-
edge. Accepting this state provides no impetus for cooperative
work or for attaining generality and consensus.
The other hypothetical field has phenomena of equal com-
plexity and difficulty, and it also began with the same unorga-
nized growth of theory. But the field devoted part of its time
and effort in working those theories, that is, in assessing what
phenomena the various theories addressed, what their meth-
ods of study were, what types of principles and concepts were
involved, and where there was redundancy and overlap, as
well as in comparing, relating, and unifying the different
theory-separated islands of knowledge. The terms for the con-
cepts and principles were standardized, and idiosyncrasy was
removed. The result was a simpler, coherent body of knowl-
edge that was also more general. That allowed people who
worked in the field to speak the same language and to do re-
search and theory developments in that language in a way that
everyone could understand. In turn, researchers could build on
one another’s work. That simplifying consensus also enabled
applied people to use the knowledge better.
It can be seen that although these two sciences are at the
same level with respect to much of their product, they are
quite different with respect to their theory advancement and
operation. The differences in the advancement of knowledge
in science areas along these lines have not been systematically
considered in the philosophy of science. There has not been an
understanding that the disunified sciences (e.g., psychology)
operate differently than do the unified sciences (e.g., physics)
that are employed as the models in the philosophy of science.
Thus, there has been no guide for theorists toworkthe fields
of personality theory and psychological testing to produce the
more advanced type of knowledge. So this remains a crying
need.