Social Cognition in Context: Motivational and Affective Influences 273effortful, and detail-oriented analysis of the social envi-
ronment. However, when epistemic motivation is low, per-
ceivers are likely to rely on their immediate reactions, which
often arise via the operation of automatic processes, the exer-
cise of relatively simple judgmental heuristics, or both (e.g.,
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These fast, top-of-the-head
reactions often seem to provide an adequate basis for under-
standing the situation, so unless there is some particularly
pressing reason to do so, pursuing more effortful and analytic
strategies may seem unnecessary.
One prototypical context within which these contingen-
cies have been much studied is the domain of stereotyping.
Recognizing the extent to which stereotypes can provide
rapid, efficient appraisals of others, Lippmann (1922) argued
that preconceptions about social groups serve a vital knowl-
edge function for perceivers. Instead of getting to know each
individual in terms of his or her own unique constellation of
characteristics (which would certainly be a daunting task in
complex, socially dense environments), we can rely to a great
extent upon generalities that subjectively seem to be suffi-
ciently accurate. Only in circumstances in which it is really
imperative to know an individual with particular accuracy do
we need to devote the extra time and energy necessary for
going beyond a stereotypical impression. Many situational
moderators of accuracy motivation have been investigated.
For example, telling people that they will be held accountable
for their judgments makes them much less reliant on stereo-
types (e.g., Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994). Being in
a position of interdependence with (or dependency on) an-
other person can provide an impetus to know the other person
more accurately and can thereby also reduce reliance on sim-
ple generalizations (e.g., Fiske & Dépret, 1996). The personal
relevance or importance of a judgment also can raise fears of
invalidity, motivating perceivers to invest more effort into the
judgment-making process (e.g., Kruglanski & Freund, 1983).
Finally, experiencing a loss of control can motivate greater
information-processing effort in subsequent judgment con-
texts (Pittman & D’Agostino, 1989). Presumably, the desire
to restore a sense of subjective control motivates careful
attention to the details of the environment in order to provide
a maximally accurate assessment of its contingencies.
Epistemic motivation also varies across persons; certain
types of individuals show a more chronic orientation toward
relatively effortful and detailed impressions of the social
world. Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, and Jarvis (1996) re-
viewed an extensive body of research on an individual differ-
ence variable that directly captures this tendency, the need for
cognition.Persons high in need for cognition are likely to
engage spontaneously in more elaborate analysis of social
information, in part because they may simply enjoy figuring
things out. Whereas others may be quite content to rely on
simple heuristics and stereotypes, individuals who possess a
higher need for cognition are unlikely to do so, provided that
they have the time and attentional resources available to think
more deeply about the judgmental situation. Another disposi-
tional quality that can motivate individuated rather than
stereotypical impressions is found in persons who experience
chronic loss of control (e.g., Edwards & Weary, 1993). Just as
individuals who have experienced a situational loss of con-
trol are motivated to repair their feelings of vulnerability by
taking care to know the environmental setting accurately, so
do persons experiencing more chronic problems with loss of
control. Individuals who experience a chronic fear of invalid-
ity for any reason are likely to have generally higher levels of
baseline motivation for systematic or effortful information
processing (see Kruglanski, 1996). Thus, greater accuracy
motivation can arise either because of (positive) enjoyment
of engaging in mental analysis or (negative) anxiety about
making a mistaken judgment or choice.
Apart from accuracy motivation, epistemic motivation
also derives from the extent to which persons feel a strong
need for closure (or its avoidance). According to Kruglanski
and Webster (1996), the need for closure involves the desire
for definite knowledge and the desire to avoid ambiguity and
uncertainty. This need, which also varies across persons and
situations, lends a sense of urgency to information processing,
leading to a tendency to seize on initial reactions rather than
pursue a more detailed analytical course. In addition, this need
also invokes a desire to maintain closure. Situational varia-
tions in need for closure can be created, for example, by ma-
nipulating the deadline for judgments. Many investigations of
the need for closure have examined more enduring, disposi-
tional variations. Consequences of high need for closure have
now been documented in many social settings. For example,
de Dreu, Koole, and Oldersma (1999) showed that persons
high in the need for closure were more likely use simplifying
heuristics in a negotiation setting. Shah, Kruglanski, and
Thompson (1998) showed that need for closure increased in-
group favoritism and out-group derogation—both processes
that can be attributed to the invocation of simple evaluative
heuristics. When individuals want an answer quickly, they are
thus unlikely to go beyond their initial reactions; to do so
might necessitate addressing complexities and ambiguities
that would only undermine the press for closure.Defensive MotivationThe desire for predictability and control is presumably best
served by the formation of accurate representations and
judgments. Yet sometimes the truth hurts, and we would feel