Social Cognition in Context: Motivational and Affective Influences 275ways we want it to be (Kunda, 1990; MacCoun, 1998). Fortu-
nately for the social perceiver, given the often-considerable
ambiguity of social stimuli, the need to feel that one has
accurate knowledge can often be met while simultaneously
pursuing the need to feel good about oneself. But just what
mechanisms are available to produce the desired self-serving
impressions and judgments? There are many such mecha-
nisms. First, perceivers may selectively attend to stimuli
in ways that provide desired outcomes. In one recent demon-
stration, Mussweiler, Gabriel, and Bodenhausen (2000)
showed, for example, that when put in the threatening position
of having been outperformed by another person, people tend
to strategically focus on aspects of their own identity that
serve to differentiate them from the upward comparison stan-
dard. For example, a European American woman who is out-
performed by an Asian woman may activate self-definitions in
which her ethnicity is more salient. People generally find sim-
ilar others to be more relevant bases for social comparison, so
by emphasizing an aspect of her identity that differentiates her
from a potential comparison standard, she renders that stan-
dard less diagnostic for self-evaluation. Use of this identity
differentiation strategy is indeed associated with greater posi-
tive affect and enhanced situational self-esteem following an
upward comparison.
A particularly powerful demonstration of motivated selec-
tivity in the use of identity dimensions was provided by
Sinclair and Kunda (1999). In their research, they presented
individuals with evaluative feedback that ostensibly came
from a source that was simultaneously a member of both a
positively stereotyped and a negatively stereotyped group.
For example, the participants were either praised or criticized
by an African American doctor. Having been criticized, par-
ticipants were motivated to discredit the evaluator, and they
tended to activate African American stereotypes while at the
same time inhibiting doctor stereotypes. Conversely, having
been praised, participants were motivated to imbue the eval-
uator with credibility, so they tended to activate doctor
stereotypes while simultaneously inhibiting African Ameri-
can stereotypes. This research suggests an important mecha-
nism whereby desired conclusions can be reached: By
inhibiting stimulus dimensions that could challenge the pre-
ferred impression, perceivers do not have to face their un-
wanted implications. Selective attention is clearly a hallmark
of motivated social cognition.
Perceivers can also selectively sample from their memo-
ries in order to reach desired conclusions. For example,
Sanitioso, Kunda, and Fong (1990) showed that after receiv-
ing information indicating that introverts (or, alternatively,
extroverts) are more likely to enjoy positive academic and
social outcomes, people selectively recalled past behaviors
that were consistent with the desirable characteristic. There
are many ways in which we selectively construct autobio-
graphical memories in order to confirm our desired
beliefs about ourselves (e.g., Ross & Wilson, 2000). Similar
processes may operate in our perceptions of others. That is,
we may selectively remember the “facts” differently about
liked versus disliked others, giving the benefit of the doubt to
those toward whom we feel an affinity by recalling their most
favorable moments; however, when we pause to think about
those to whom we feel enmity, we may conjure up episodes
when they were at their worst. Moreover, if confronted with
an irrefutable set of facts, perceivers always have the option
of explaining the facts in different ways. For instance, a liked
individual (or group) will be assumed to be more responsible
for a positive event than a disliked entity would be, whereas
negative events may be seen as more situationally caused for
liked (versus disliked) social entities (e.g., Pettigrew, 1979;
Regan, Straus, & Fazio, 1974). Further, the perceived trait
implications of a behavior can depend critically on whether
we are motivated to think well or ill of the actor. An ambigu-
ously aggressive behavior may be seen as disgraceful hostil-
ity when performed by an African American, yet the same
behavior may be seen as a playful interaction when per-
formed by a European American (e.g., Sagar & Schofield,
1980). Again, the inherent ambiguity of many social events
lends itself to creative and selective interpretations and
reconstructions.
Perceivers can also apply differential evidentiary standards,
depending on the desirability of the implied conclusion. Natu-
rally, a more stringent criterion of proof is required for un-
wanted or unpleasant conclusions compared to pleasing ones
(Ditto & Lopez, 1992). That is to say, if an initial consideration
of the evidence supports a desired conclusion, we may be quite
content to stop, but if the initial implications are displeasing,
we may sort through the evidence much more extensively and
subject the counterevidence to our desired conclusions to par-
ticularly harsh scrutiny. In this way, effortful reasoning can be
engaged in the service of producing desired impressions and
judgments. We also may estimate the likelihood of events at
least partially in terms of their desirability. This form of wish-
ful thinking appears to be a ubiquitous source of bias in belief-
based reasoning (McGuire, 1960). However, the fact that our
expectations tend to covary with our desires can also reflect
the simultaneous operation of a mechanism whereby desires
are constrained by reality—that is, just as we may want to
think that desirable events are more probable, we may also
determine what it is that we desire in part by assessing its
attainability.
It is thus evident that the wily social perceiver has many
strategies for getting what he or she wants. Via selective