Different Research Programs on Emotion 2875.All emotions other than the basic ones are subcategories
or mixtures of the basic emotions.
6.Signals for basic emotions are recognized by any normal
human being.
7.Voluntary facial expressions are deceptive and culturally
determined.
The FEP stimulated the gathering of a vast quantity of
data, much of it aimed at establishing one fact: Across a range
of ages and cultures, human beings can attribute the same
emotions to select facial configurations. But this fact (assum-
ing it is a fact; cf. Russell, 1994) would establish only one of
the basic principles of the FEP. For example, research has not
yet shown that an allegedly universally recognized facial ex-
pression is a manifestation in all human societies of the very
emotion recognized. Indeed, available data make this as-
sumption doubtful (see Camras; 2000; Fernández-Dols &
Ruiz-Belda, 1997; Fridlund, 1994).
The FEP has generated much valuable data on how people
associate emotion names with facial expressions and on
physiological or vocal patterns of those said to have those
emotions. Curiously, no data have been gathered to establish
the existence of anger, fear, and other basic emotions beyond
the facial configurations, vocal and physiological patterns,
and so on from which the emotion is inferred—that is, be-
yond the emotion’s observable manifestations. Instead, the
emphasis has been on the importance (in Darwinian terms,
theadaptiveness) of emotion. This approach is reminiscent of
another argument in the ontological tradition: Anselm’s onto-
logical argument for the existence of God, by which the
meaning of the word Godimplies the necessity of his exis-
tence. By definition, God is perfect, but nonexistence would
be an imperfection and therefore a contradiction. Emotions
are important (adaptive), but a nonexistent entity could not be
important.
Appraisal Theories
The clearest candidate for the research program that is re-
placing FEP as dominant in the psychology of emotion today
is known as appraisal theory. Appraisal theory (see Frijda,
1986; Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001)
shares with FEP the assumption that emotions are adaptive
entities that have evolved to respond quickly to recurring
important circumstances. Appraisal theories can be thought
of as a development of FEP in which emphasis is put on a
cognitive step between those circumstances and the emotion
(event→appraisal→emotion). (Some versions of appraisal
theory assume that appraisals are a part of the emotion). An
appraisal provides an explanation for (a) which situations
elicit which emotions and (b) individual differences in the
stimulus-response link. (For example, if you appraise dogs as
threats, then, for you, dog →threat→fear; but if you like
dogs, then dog →good→happy.) The main question then
becomes the nature of appraisal. In the earliest versions, ap-
praisal was a simple evaluation (Arnold, 1960). In later ver-
sions, appraisals became increasingly complex and took into
account a person’s plans, beliefs, desires, values, and so on
(Lazarus, 1991).
One appraisal theorist, Smith (Smith & Kirby, 2001), noted
the ontological assumptions of appraisal theories. These theo-
ries generally share with FEP assumptions about emotions as
entities, but they also began by assuming that appraisals are
also entities (which are capable of producing emotions). This
ontological predisposition can be seen in the primary method
used: If a subject could label an appraisal with a word such as
threatorgood,then these specific appraisals were assumed to
exist and to trigger the emotion. Smith and Kirby called for
more circumspect inferences from such methods and for the
use of methods that focus on the actual processes that consti-
tute appraisals.Concluding CommentThe ontological approach has been an enormous success—
indeed, sometimes a victim of its own successes. For exam-
ple, data generated by the FEP unveiled extraordinary
complexity within “basic” emotions. Facial, vocal, and
instrumental behavior, as well as cognitive appraisal, subjec-
tive experience, and physiological changes all show much
more variability within each emotion than anticipated
(Ortony & Turner, 1990; Smith & Scott, 1997). Further, these
separate components do not correlate with each other as
highly as anticipated (Lang, 1994). As a second example, the
ontological approach has relied heavily on human judgment
studies (e.g., in the studies on recognition of emotion from
faces or in questionnaire studies on appraisal). This method
did not yield the simple patterns anticipated, but it did pave
the way for the study of a completely different topic: the cog-
nitive representation of emotion.Emotion as DiscourseA very different reaction to observations about cultural dif-
ferences comes from a loosely related group known as social
constructionists (e.g., Averill, 1982; Harré, 1986; Kemper,
1978; Lutz, 1988; Parkinson, 1995). Social constructionist
ideas show the influence of nominalism and focus on dis-
course about emotion. They also emphasize cultural differ-
ences in the observable antecedents and consequences of