306 Attitudes in Social Behavior
Two early theoretical statements are the best-known mod-
els of attitude function (D. Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner, &
White, 1956). Smith et al. (1956) suggested that attitudes serve
three functions: object appraisal, social adjustment, and exter-
nalization.Object appraisalrefers to the ability of attitudes to
summarize the positive and negative attributes of objects in
our environment;social adjustmentis served by attitudes that
help us to identify with people whom we like and to dissociate
from people whom we dislike; andexternalizationis fulfilled
by attitudes that defend the self against internal conflict.
D. Katz (1960) proposed four attitude functions, which over-
lap with those proposed by Smith et al. (1956): knowledge,
utility, value expression, and ego defense. Theknowledge
function represents the ability of attitudes to summarize infor-
mation about attitude objects; theutilitarianfunction exists in
attitudes that maximize rewards and minimize punishments
obtained from attitude objects; thevalue-expressivefunction
exists in attitudes that express the self-concept and central val-
ues (e.g., equality, freedom; Maio & Olson, 1998; Rokeach,
1973; Schwartz, 1992); and theego-defensivefunction pro-
tects self-esteem.
The object-appraisal function (which combines aspects
of the utilitarian and knowledge functions) perhaps best ex-
plains why people form attitudes in the first place. This func-
tion implies that attitudes classify objects in the environment
for the purposes of action. Moreover, it can be argued that all
strong attitudes simplify interaction with the environment in
this way, regardless of whether the attitudes imply favorabity
or unfavorability toward the attitude object.
Two important themes have emerged in research on atti-
tude functions since these early theoretical statements. First,
as just noted, evidence suggests that strong attitudes fulfill
an object-appraisal function. Second, a distinction between
instrumental attitudes (serving a utilitarian function) and
symbolic attitudes (serving a value-expressive function) ap-
pears to be useful. In the following sections, we describe the
evidence regarding these observations.
Object Appraisal
In their description of the object-appraisal function, Smith
et al. (1956) hypothesized that attitudes are energy-saving
devices, because attitudes make attitude-relevant judgments
faster and easier to perform. Two programs of research have
directly supported this reasoning while suggesting important
caveats. First, Fazio (1995, 2000) argued that the object-
appraisal function should be more strongly served by atti-
tudes that are spontaneously activated from memory when the
object is encountered than by attitudes that are not sponta-
neously retrieved. This prediction is based on the assumption
that activated attitudes guide relevant judgments and behav-
ior, whereas dormant attitudes have little effect during judg-
ment and behavior processes. Consistent with this hypothesis
is that highly accessible attitudes (either measured via re-
sponse latency or manipulated via repeated attitude expres-
sion) have been shown to increase the ease with which people
make attitude-relevant judgments. For example, people who
have accessible attitudes toward an abstract painting have
been shown to be subsequently faster at deciding whether
they prefer the painting over another painting; they also ex-
hibit less physiological arousal during these preference deci-
sions than do people who have less accessible attitudes (see
Fazio, 2000).
Another program of research has revealed that the strength
of the object-appraisal motivation is influenced by levels of
the need for closure, which is a “desire for a definite answer
on some topic, anyanswer as opposed to confusion and am-
biguity” (Kruglanski, 1989, p. 14). Of course, the object-
appraisal function reflects the notion that attitudes can
provide such answers because attitudes help people to make
decisions about attitude objects. Consequently, a high need
for closure should increase the desire to form and maintain
attitudes. Kruglanski (1996) has tested this hypothesis using
an individual difference measure of need for closure and sit-
uational manipulations of the need for closure (which involve
imposing or withdrawing situational pressures to resolve un-
certainty). As expected, the effects of need for closure on at-
titude change depended on whether participants had already
formed an attitude toward the assigned topic. If participants
had already formed an attitude, those who were high in need
for closure were less persuaded by new information than
were participants who were low in need for closure. In con-
trast, if participants had not yet formed an attitude, those who
were high in need for closure were more persuaded by new
information than were participants who were low in need for
closure. Thus, the need for closure was associated with a ten-
dency to form and maintain attitudes.Instrumental Versus Symbolic AttitudesNumerous researchers have argued for a distinction between
instrumental (or utilitarian) and symbolic (or value-
expressive) attitudes (e.g., Herek, 1986; Prentice, 1987; Sears,
1988). Instrumental attitudes classify attitude objects accord-
ing to their ability to promote self-interest, whereas symbolic
attitudes express concerns about self-image and personal
values (Herek, 1986; Sears, 1988). This distinction has been
used to understand attitudes toward many social groups (e.g.,