Handbook of Psychology, Volume 5, Personality and Social Psychology

(John Hannent) #1
Toward Coherence in Social Influence 409

and Catholicism. As noted above, research exploring the
social change implications of the model has verified that cul-
tural bias is indeed a significant factor in determining the ex-
tent to which a new idea or ideology can take hold in a society
(cf. Nowak & Vallacher, 2001).
It is interesting to consider cultural differences in terms of
the specific combinations of self-influence, noise, and bias.
Two industrialized societies may both have high levels of
self-influence (i.e., an individualistic orientation), for exam-
ple, but they may differ considerably in their respective lev-
els of noise (e.g., selective exposure to mass media) or their
bias toward various positions (e.g., religious beliefs). Be-
cause each of these variables plays a unique role in social in-
fluence, the interaction among them is likely to be decisive in
shaping the predominant form of social influence characteriz-
ing a given society. Cultural variation in social influence
processes, in other words, conceivably can be traced to the
specific blend of variables in the cellular automata model.
The investigation of this possibility provides an important
agenda for future research concerning the relationship be-
tween micro- and macrolevels of social reality.


TOWARD COHERENCE IN SOCIAL INFLUENCE


Social influence is clearly a big topic, a fact that reflects its
centrality to the field of social psychology. The enormous
range of ideas and principles associated with this topic, how-
ever, is a mixed blessing. On the one hand, the diversity of
social influence phenomena and processes attests to the un-
deniable complexity of human social experience. But on
the negative side of the ledger, this very diversity can prove
vexing for those—laypeople and theorists alike—who seek
integration and synthesis in their understanding. Several hun-
dred studies and dozens of distinct mechanisms may well be
necessary to capture the nuances of such a wide-ranging
topic, but this state of affairs does little to inspire a feeling of
coherent understanding. Like the field of social psychology
as a whole (cf. Vallacher & Nowak, 1994), the subfield of
social influence is highly fragmented, with poorly defined
connections among the separate elements that define it.
Ironically, if there is a basis for theoretical coherence in
social influence, it may reflect what psychologists have
learned about the dynamics of coherence in recent years.
Despite the enormous complexity of human minds and so-
cial groups—or perhaps because of such complexity—
psychological systems at different levels of personal and
social reality display self-organization and the emergence of
higher-level properties. The mutual influences among the
elements in each system promote such emergence, and the


resultant properties in turn provide functional integration
and coordination for the component elements. This reciprocal
feedback between lower-level elements and higher-level
properties may constitute an invariant principle common to
all social psychological processes—or to all complex sys-
tems, for that matter (cf. Nowak & Vallacher, 1998a). Thus,
the specific cognitive elements defining the stream of thought
become self-organized with respect to higher-order judg-
ments and values (Vallacher, Nowak, & Kaufman, 1994),
specific movements and perceptions become coordinated to
produce meaningful action (cf. Vallacher et al., 1998), indi-
viduals become integrated into higher-order functional units
such as dyads and social groups (e.g., Nowak et al., 2002),
and social groups become coordinated with respect to larger
goals and values that define the social system in which they
are embedded (cf. Nowak & Vallacher, 2001).
With this in mind, it is tempting to consider whether a
press for higher-order coherence provides a common denom-
inator for the otherwise dizzying array of specific social in-
fluence processes. Perhaps seemingly distinct means of
influencing people prove effective or ineffective depending
on how well each taps into established rules regarding coher-
ence in thought and action. If so, many of the phenomena dis-
cussed in this chapter could be reframed so as to underscore
their common features, and new predictions could be gener-
ated about the factors that determine whether a given influ-
ence strategy will prove successful in a particular context for
a particular target. The central idea is that influence involves
resynchronization of the elements in the target’s relevant cog-
nitive structure. Achieving resynchronization is difficult,
however, when the cognitive structure in question is well-
integrated and stable. To promote a change in behavior in
this case, it is necessary to disassemble or otherwise destabi-
lize the associated cognitive structure. After the structure is
destabilized, the person is primed for resynchronization in
line with cues to higher-order meaning provided by the influ-
ence agent.
A basic strategy for resynchronizing people’s thoughts and
desires follows from the emergence process of action identifi-
cation theory (cf. Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Vallacher et al.,
1998). Research on this process has revealed that when peo-
ple do not have an integrated representation of what they are
doing, they become highly sensitive to coherent perspectives
on their behavior provided by others. The extrapolation of
this process to social influence is straightforward. In this sce-
nario, the influence agent first induces the target to consider
the relevant topic or action in concrete, low-level terms. Get-
ting the target to engage in topic-relevant behavior has this
effect, provided the behavior is sufficiently novel or complex
that it requires attention to detail. Simply describing an action
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