Application and Extension of Existing Theory 467escape just as well and at less cost, as long as the old adage
“out of sight, out of mind” works.
Variations on the theme of aversive-arousal reduction have
been provided by Hornstein (1982), Reykowski (1982), and
Lerner (1982). Focusing on the self-other relationship,
Hornstein suggested that when certain others are in need—
specifically, those whom one cognitively links to self as “us”
and “we” rather than “them” and “they”—one experiences a
state of promotive tension in which one is “aroused by
another’sneeds almost as if they were one’s own” (Hornstein,
1982, p. 230). Once so aroused, one is motivated to reduce this
tension by aiding the fellow “we-grouper.”
Reykowski’s (1982) proposed explanation, though quite
different, also involves reduction of aversive tension: “The
sheer discrepancy between information about the real or pos-
sible state of an object and standards of its normal or desir-
able state will evoke motivation” (p. 361). Reykowski
applied this general principle to prosocial motivation as
follows: If a person perceives a discrepancy between the cur-
rent state and the expected or ideal state of another person
(i.e., perceives the other to be in need), cognitive inconsis-
tency and motivation to reduce this aversive inconsistency
will result. Relieving the other’s need is one way to remove
the inconsistency and escape the situation. Another, less
prosocial way is to change one’s perception and decide that
the other’s suffering is acceptable, even desirable.
Lerner’s (1980, 1982) just-world hypothesis led him to an
explanation similar to but more specific than Reykowski’s.
Lerner suggested that most people believe in a just world—a
world in which people get what they deserve and deserve
what they get. The existence of a victim of innocent suffering
is inconsistent with this belief. In order to reduce the arousal
produced by this inconsistency, a person may help another in
need. Alternatively, the person may derogate the innocent
victim, making the suffering appear deserved.
At first glance, Cialdini’s negative-state relief model may
appear to be another example of aversive-arousal reduction.
In fact, it is not. Although it too begins with the proposition
that seeing someone in need evokes a negative affective state,
from this common starting point the two explanations
diverge. The negative-state relief explanation claims that the
goal of helping is to obtain mood-enhancing self-rewards that
one has learned are associated with helping; aversive-arousal
reduction explanations claim that the goal of helping is to
eliminate the mood-depressing stimulus. Negative-state re-
lief is a social learning explanation that assumes that the in-
creased need for some type—any type—of mood-enhancing
reward motivates helping; aversive-arousal reduction expla-
nations make no assumptions about prior learning history but
focus instead on reduction of current tension.
Norms and RolesTheories that seek to explain prosocial behavior in terms of
norms and roles often make heavy use of social learning prin-
ciples. Yet norm and role theories are not direct descendants
of classic learning theory and behaviorism. Instead, they
trace their ancestry to symbolic interactionism and its
analysis of social behavior using a dramaturgical metaphor
(cf. Goffman, 1959; Mead, 1934). Within this metaphor,
norms provide the script of the social drama, specifying what
should be done and said when; roles are the parts to be
played. (More formally, normsare a group’s written or un-
written rules of appropriate behavior for those occupying
particular roles; rolesare behavior patterns that are character-
istic, and expected, of a person who occupies a particular
position in a social structure.)
In both developmental and social psychology, norms and
roles have been adopted into the social learning family; it is
assumed that people learn the norms and roles appropriate to
a given situation through social reinforcement and modeling.
At the same time that people are learning that acting proso-
cially can bring rewards, they are also learning the norms for
prosocial behaviors that should be performed by individuals
in various roles in different social situations. These norms
dictate that one should help people in need—at least some
people under some circumstances—to avoid social or self-
administered sanctions.ReciprocityOne prosocial norm that has been studied extensively is reci-
procity. Gouldner (1960) suggested that this norm tells people
both that they should help people who help them and that they
should not injure these people. He believed that this norm was
universal, an important part of the moral code of every culture.
He also believed that the pressure on a person to comply with
the norm of reciprocity depends on the circumstances under
which the initial help was given—including (a) how badly one
needed help, (b) one’s perception of how much the other
person gave relative to his or her total resources, (c) one’s
perception of the other person’s motives for helping (was it a
bribe?), and (d) whether the other person helped voluntarily or
was pressured into it. Much evidence supports the claim that
people are motivated to comply with the norm of reciprocity
(e.g., Wilke & Lanzetta, 1982).Social ResponsibilityA second norm that psychologists have suggested motivates
helping is social responsibility. This norm dictates that one