474 Altruism and Prosocial Behavior
obtaining one or another form of self-benefit (egoism)? This
has been called the altruism question (Batson, 1991).
The Altruism Question
One easy answer to the altruism question that can quickly be
laid to rest goes like this: Even if it were possible for a person
to be motivated to increase another’s welfare, such a person
would be pleased by attaining this desired goal, so even this
apparent altruism would be a product of egoism. In the
words of Tolman’s (1923) well-turned epithet, this argument
is “more brilliant than cogent” (p. 203). Philosophers have
shown it to be flawed by pointing out that it involves a confu-
sion between two different forms of psychological hedonism.
Thestrongform of hedonism asserts that the ultimate goal of
human action is always the attainment of personal pleasure;
theweakform asserts only that goal attainment always brings
pleasure. The weak form is not inconsistent with the altruistic
claim that the ultimate goal of some action is to benefit an-
other rather than to benefit oneself; the pleasure obtained can
be a consequence of reaching this goal without being the goal
itself. The strong form of psychological hedonism is incon-
sistent with the possibility of altruism, but to affirm this form
is simply to assert that altruism does not exist, an empirical
assertion that may or may not be true (see MacIntyre, 1967,
for discussion of these philosophical arguments).
More serious advocates of universal egoism argue that
some specific self-benefit is always the ultimate goal of help-
ing; benefiting the other is simply an instrumental goal on the
way to one or another ultimately self-serving end. They point
to all the self-benefits of helping: the material, social, and self-
rewards received; the material, social, and self-punishments
avoided; and aversive-arousal reduction. Advocates of altru-
ism counter that simply because self-benefits follow from
benefiting another, this does not prove that the self-benefits
were the helper’s ultimate goal. These self-benefits may be
unintended consequences of reaching the ultimate goal of
benefiting the other. If so, the motivation would be altruistic,
not egoistic.
Advocates of altruism claim more than possibility, of
course. They claim that altruistic motivation exists, that at
least some people under some circumstances act with the
ultimate goal of increasing another person’s welfare.
The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis
Over the centuries, the most frequently proposed source of
altruistic motivation has been an other-oriented emotional
response congruent with the perceived welfare of another
person—today usually called empathy(Batson, 1987) or
sympathy(Wispé, 1986). If another person is in need, these
empathic emotions include sympathy, compassion, tender-
ness, and the like. Theempathy-altruism hypothesisclaims
that these emotions evoke motivation with an ultimate goal of
benefiting the person for whom the empathy is felt—that is,
altruistic motivation. Various forms of this hypothesis have
been espoused by Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, Adam
Smith, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and William
McDougall, as well as in contemporary psychology by
Hoffman (1975), Krebs (1975), and Batson (1987).
Considerable evidence supports the idea that feeling em-
pathy for a person in need leads to increased helping of that
person (see Batson, 1991; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, for re-
views). Observing an empathy-helping relationship, how-
ever, tells us nothing about the nature of the motivation that
underlies this relationship. Increasing the other person’s wel-
fare could be (a) an ultimate goal, producing self-benefits as
unintended consequences; (b) an instrumental goal on the
way to the ultimate goal of gaining one or more self-benefits;
or (c) both. That is, the motivation could be altruistic, egois-
tic, or both.Egoistic Alternatives to the Empathy-Altruism HypothesisThree general classes of self-benefits can result from helping
a person for whom one feels empathy. Such help can (a) re-
duce one’s empathic arousal, which may be experienced as
aversive; (b) enable one to avoid possible social and self-
punishments for failing to help; and (c) enable one to gain
social and self-rewards for doing what is good and right. The
empathy-altruism hypothesis does not deny that these self-
benefits of empathy-induced helping exist. It claims that they
are unintended consequences of the empathically aroused
helper reaching the ultimate goal of reducing the other’s
suffering. Proponents of egoistic alternatives to the empathy-
altruism hypothesis disagree. They claim that one or more of
these self-benefits are the ultimate goal of empathy-induced
helping. In the past two decades more than 30 experiments
have tested these three egoistic alternatives against the
empathy-altruism hypothesis.
The most frequently proposed egoistic explanation of the
empathy-helping relationship is aversive-arousal reduction.
This explanation claims that feeling empathy for someone
who is suffering is unpleasant, and empathically aroused in-
dividuals help in order to benefit themselves by eliminating
their empathic feelings. Benefiting the victim is simply a
means to this self-serving end.
Over half a dozen experiments have tested the aversive-
arousal reduction explanation against the empathy-altruism
hypothesis by varying the ease of escape from further exposure