The Concern for Justice—The Justice Motive 541theories, the one with fewer postulates is the more parsimo-
nious. Such a comparison presupposes that both theories
explain the same empirical phenomena and allow the same
predictions. A motivation theory that posits only a small
number of motives—or even a single one—would seem to
be more parsimonious than would one that offers a larger
number of motives.
The parsimony argument may have added to the reduc-
tionistic stance that the justice motive (as well as other mo-
tives such as altruism, social responsibility, love, etc.) can in
fact be reduced to or unmasked, so to speak, as self-interest.
The economic analysis of behavior (Ramb & Tietzel, 1993)
suggests that a great variety of behavior (if not all) can be ex-
plained by assuming some degree of self-interest as the basic
motivation. This idea is illustrated in the following examples
(cf. Montada, 1998a):
- Hypothetically, caring for disabled parents can easily be
traced back to selfish motivations such as the desire to cul-
tivate a favorable public image or to ensure that the par-
ents do not withdraw their love or financial support. - Hypothetically, improvements in community or state care
for the poor can be interpreted as enhancing political
leaders’ chances of being elected by these less privileged
voters. - As mentioned previously, the avoidance of opportunistic
and selfish behavior can reasonably be interpreted as self-
serving in the context of continued social exchanges.
The economic theory of behavior allows elegant so-called
explanations of every action by tracing a path to some basic
hypothetical self-interest (e.g., Baurmann & Kliemt, 1995).
With some ingenuity, it is possible to generate hypotheses re-
ducing every surface motive to an underlying self-interest, or
to unmask it as ultimately serving self-interest. This kind of
hypothesizing may be creative, but it clearly does not consti-
tute valid scientific proof of the hypotheses proposed. Instead
of asking the scientific question What explains X?,rational-
choice theorists ask How might a rational-choice theory
explain X?(Green & Shapiro, 1994, p. 203). Bunge has
therefore criticized rational-choice modeling, arguing that it
has “inhibited the search for alternatives” (1989, p. 210).
Approaching the scientific task of explaining the interindi-
vidual and intra-individual variance of human behavior with a
single-motive model is counterproductive because this single
motive (maximizing one’s self-interest) does not contribute to
the explanation of the behavioral variance. The statement that
a person’s behavior is motivated by self-interest has no infor-
mational value and no scientific validity as long as alternative
motives such as altruism, social responsibility, the justice
motive, and moral obligation are not tested and excluded
by empirical data. Furthermore, the seeming parsimony of a
single-motive model is offset by the necessary increase in the
number of corollary hypotheses needed to predict and explain
the behavioral variance and the diversity of behaviors ob-
served. Single-motive conceptions may best be understood as
anthropological predecisions without scientific validity or
utility. They are part of a belief system, not of a scientific
knowledge system.Trade-Offs Between the Justice Motive
and Other MotivesLerner (1977, 1980, 1998) has stressed the categorical nor-
mative quality of the justice motive as a primary motive and
as an aim in itself. After it is internalized as a normative stan-
dard, justice imposes itself as an ought—valid for oneself and
for others, not as an option that can be rationally deliberated
and chosen when it seems functional for a particular goal or
disregarded without moral disquiet if other options arise.
Defining justice as an ought implies that unjustified viola-
tions evoke moral emotions—guilt when the subject him- or
herself has failed to meet the requirements of the ought by
action or omission, and resentment when others have done so
(Montada, 1993).
We agree that the justice motive may come into conflict
with other motives such as self-interest, but can it be trumped
by egoism without remorse (cf. Lerner, 1996, on managers’
guilt after layoff decisions)? Lerner doubts whether humans
can give up the fundamental delusive belief that the world is
a place where everybody gets what he or she deserves—
ultimately, at least. This motivated belief in a just world
(BJW) is supported by what Lerner has called the personal
contractto observe the rule of justice.
Lerner has contributed and instigated a wealth of empiri-
cal studies showing that the justice motive does not always
appear as a straightforward application of standards of jus-
tice. Trade-offs between what one deserves and what others
deserve are elaborated in specific situations, as are trade-offs
between justice concerns and other concerns such as self-
interest (Montada, 1998b). The three psychologically fasci-
nating phenomena described in the following passage can be
interpreted as examples of trade-offs between justice con-
cerns and self-interests.
Blaming innocent victimsis a phenomenon observed in
many experiments conducted by Lerner and his students
(cf. Lerner, 1980), as well as in studies carried out elsewhere
(cf. Furnham, 1998; Maes, 1998; Montada, 1998b). Blaming
victims is plausibly interpreted as subjects’ doing an injustice
in an attempt to preserve their belief in a just world, which is