The Justice of Distributions 543THE JUSTICE OF DISTRIBUTIONS
Standards of Distributive Justice
Inthe domain of distributions—that is, the allocation or the
existing distribution of material resources or symbolic goods,
rights, duties, positions, power, opportunities, taxes, and so
on, within as well as between groups and populations—
equalitycertainly constitutes the basic idea of justice. How-
ever, equality can be specified in many different ways. It may
meanequal shares for all human beingsor—if that is impos-
sible or dysfunctional—equal opportunities.Alternatively,
according to Aristotle, it may mean equal shares or equal op-
portunities for all equal human beings. This second view im-
plies that human beings differ and that specific individual
differences justify unequal allocations and given inequalities
in the distribution of resources, rights, duties, and so forth
(e.g., according to citizenship, social status, specific merits,
professional qualifications, productivity, age, conventional
rights, gender, neediness). In this sense, equality means equal
shares for all those with the same status, for all those with
the same kinds of merits, needs, conventional rights, and so
forth. That implies unequal shares for people with different
status, merits, and so forth. A particular variant of the equal
opportunity rule is the equal chance rule, in which a lottery
procedure is used when it is impossible for goods to be split
up (e.g., in the allocation of organs for transplantation), or the
rotation schedule, which may be appropriate when it would
be dysfunctional for a position to be split. Equal opportunity
may also mean providing similar material, physical, and so-
cial conditions for development, for a good life, for health,
and so on.
Walzer (1983) somewhat neutralized the justice problems
with inequalities in allocations and existing distributions by
his concept ofcomplex equality,which postulates that distri-
butions in differentspheres of justice(material wealth, social
recognition in various contexts, political power, education,
kinship and love, recreation time, etc.) are not perfectly cor-
related. Thus, a lower rank in one sphere may be compen-
sated by a higher ranking in another. Moreover, the subjective
importance of the different spheres of justice varies within a
population, so that the perceived overall inequalities may be
reduced further.
However, the question of which differences between peo-
ple justify which inequalities in allocations and distributions
remains open. In the ongoing discussions, arguments are in-
spired by cultural traditions and social philosophies such as
egalitarianism, liberalism, social welfarism, utilitarianism,
and the human and civil rights movements. We are far
from having reached a general consensus on this question;
the preferred standards of distributive justice vary be-
tween and within cultures and they are subject to historical
changes.
This fact applies across all fields of distributive justice.
For instance, the populations of postcommunist states are less
tolerant of inequalities, and they claim more responsibility
for individual welfare from the governments than do the pop-
ulations of states with a liberal tradition (Kluegel, Mason, &
Wegener, 1995). The rules of justice for the allocation and
withdrawal of scarce goods such as scholarships, state-
subsidized housing, jobs, and so on vary largely within and
across states (Elster, 1992). In the dismissal of employees,
for instance, the criteria applied include the employees’
seniority, acquired skills, current productivity, neediness,
responsibility for a family, age, and gender. Although it
may be possible to justify the application of each of these cri-
teria, each could result in different decisions—not a single
just solution. Therefore, the application of different justice
principles can result in grossly diverging outcomes. Given
this multitude of justice criteria, conflicts about which ones
would be appropriate in which cases are not surprising.
Although a long list of justice principles has been identi-
fied empirically (Reis, 1984), psychological research has
largely been limited to three of them:equality(equal shares
for all those within specified social boundaries),allocation
according to merit or to contributions(achievements, in-
vestments, etc.), andallocation according to needs.More-
over, most empirical research has focused on the application
of these principles in single concrete allocations of material
goods. Fewer psychological studies are available on the al-
location of symbolic goods, rights, and positions, on the
withdrawal of positions, or on the allocation of loads (e.g.,
tasks, taxes; for a comprehensive review, see Törnblom,
1992). Data have been gathered on individual preferences
for a particular justice principle in specific cases and con-
texts (e.g., Schmitt & Montada, 1981), and for culturally
shared preferences (e.g., Bierbrauer, 2000; Schwinger,
1980).The Choice of a PrincipleViewing the application of a justice principle as a choice raises
a question as to the goals of a specific choice: Is the objective
merely to act or evaluate justly, or to avoid disharmony, to
strengthen solidarity, to demonstrate solidarity, to motivate
performances or effort, to punish laziness, to enhance produc-
tivity within a social system by stimulating competitiveness,
or perhaps to further the health and growth of the recipients?
Deutsch (1975), for instance, has argued that people who
pursue economic productivity should use proportionality to