38 Cultural Perspectives on Personality and Social Psychology
modes of self-construal, Markus and Kitayama did not adopt
all of the assumptions of the individualism-collectivism
framework as developed by early cross-cultural psycholo-
gists. In contrast to such theorists, for example, they were
concerned with the cultural psychological agenda of identi-
fying insights for basic psychological theory of cultural
variation (e.g., identifying new culturally based forms of mo-
tivation), rather than with the cross-cultural agenda of apply-
ing existing psychological theories in diverse cultural
contexts (e.g., identifying cultural variation in the emphasis
placed on internal vs. external locus of control, as specified
by Rotter’s framework). They tended to eschew the use of
scale measures of individualism-collectivism; they also did
not draw some of the global contrasts made within much
work within this framework, such as devaluation of the self in
collectivism or of relationships in individualism (see discus-
sion in Kitayama, in press; J. G. Miller, 2002). However, in
part as a reflection of the interest in the distinction between
independent versus interdependent self-construals introduced
by Markus and Kitayama (1991), the number of investigators
concerned with individualism and collectivism has grown in
recent years, with many investigators drawing on this frame-
work to further the cultural psychological agenda of broaden-
ing basic psychological theory (e.g., Greenfield & Cocking,
1994; Greenfield & Suzuki, 1998), and other investigators in
social psychology drawing on the framework to further the
original agenda of theorists such as Triandis to develop a uni-
versal, ecologically based framework to explain psychologi-
cal variation on a worldwide scale (e.g., Oyserman, Coon, &
Kemmelmeier, 2002).
In terms of criticisms, the tradition of cross-cultural re-
search on individualism is limited in its emphasis on testing
the generality of existing psychological theories in diverse
cultural contexts, and in its inattention to examining the de-
gree to which such theories themselves may be culturally
bound and take somewhat contrasting forms in different cul-
tural contexts. This stance represents perhaps the most central
reason that mainstream psychologists have tended to view the
findings of research on individualism-collectivism as primar-
ily descriptive in nature rather than to view them as contribut-
ing to basic psychological theory (e.g., Shweder, 1990). The
framework of individualism-collectivism has also been sub-
ject to criticism for its global view of culture: Much work in
this tradition fails to account for subtleties in cultural mean-
ings and practices, and it has also been criticized for the some-
what stereotypical nature of its portrayal of these two cultural
systems (e.g., Dien, 1999). Thus, for example, as numerous
theorists have noted (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991; J. G.
Miller, 1994, 2002; Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake, &
Weisz, 2000), much work on individualism-collectivism has
failed to recognize that concerns with self have importance
in collectivist cultures rather than only in individualistic
cultures—although they may take somewhat contrasting
forms in the two cultural contexts, just as concerns with rela-
tionships have importance but may take different forms in the
two cultural contexts. Finally, methodological criticisms have
been directed at the widespread use of attitudinal scale mea-
sures in work in this tradition (e.g., Kitayama, 2002), with the-
orists noting the many problems associated with the limited
ability of individuals to report on the orientations emphasized
in their culture and with the inattention to everyday cultural
practices, artifacts, and routines that has characterized much
work in this tradition with its reliance on attitudinal indexes of
culture.
The individualism-collectivism framework has made
major and enduring contributions to understanding culture
and society in ecological terms. Work in this tradition has
been of great value in providing insight into processes of
modernization and cultural change, and it has assisted in
modeling how both factors in the physical environment and
social structural considerations affect psychological out-
comes. The broad framework of individualism-collectivism
has also proven useful heuristically as a source of initial
research hypotheses, with this distinction embraced—at least
in a limited way—not only by investigators concerned with
the more universalistic agenda of cross-cultural psychology,
but also by some theorists identified more explicitly with
cultural psychology (e.g., Greenfield & Suzuki, 1998).Culture and Cognitive DevelopmentEarly work on culture and cognitive development was theo-
retically diverse and international in character, drawing on
Piagetian as well as Vygotskiian viewpoints among others.
Within Piagetian viewpoints, cross-cultural research was un-
dertaken to test the presumed universality of cognitive devel-
opmental theory (Dasen, 1972; Dasen & Heron, 1981). This
work involved administering standard Piagetian cognitive
tests in different cultures after translating the tests and mak-
ing minor modifications to ensure their ecological validity.
Likewise, in the domain of moral development, Kohlbergian
measures of moral judgment were administered in a large
number of cultural settings after only minor changes in re-
search protocols were made, such as substituting local names
for those originally in the text (e.g., Edwards, 1986;
Kohlberg, 1969; Snarey, 1985). The findings on Piagetian
tasks suggested that in certain African settings, cognitive de-
velopment proceeds at a slower rate than that observed in