106 Scarcity and Surfeitthe rural population, and their internment in so-called regroupment camps. With
a steadily declining output of staple foods, market prices have moe than dou-
bled since the onset of the crisis. Currently Burundi is a net importer of food,
while it was previously self-sufficient. Importing food requires foreign exchange,
which, as we will see, is allocated predominantly to the small and inefficient
industrial sector and the army, and not to ensuring the food security of the
majority of the population.
The urban bias of state investment also contributes to the under-resourc-
ing of the agricultural sector. While over 90% of the population live in rural
areas, total state funding for the rural sector amounted to 20% in the 1980s.
In contrast, Bujumbura and its hinterland received 50% of all public invest-
ment, and 90% of all social sector expendit~re.~~
In contrast to the neglect of agriculture in terms of investment, 48% of GDP
in 1996 was invested in 37 fully state-controlled firms. If parastatal firms are
considered in addition, 77% of GDP flowed into the sector. These firms are
easy pickings for the predatory elite. They benefit directly from agricultural
pricing, and they receive the vast majority of foreign exchange allocations from
the central bank. They also have the political function, mentioned above, of
providing a soft landing for ex-politicians. "Rent sharing in Burundi has been
used as a political tool to calm down opposition, to buy out potential trouble
makers and warmongers or to pay for the loyalty of fellow politician^."^^
The bureaucracy also, in practice, controls the extremely small private sec-
tor. Virtually all private firms are owned by ex-civil servants, and the prof-
itability of these firms is observed to change when there is a change of politi-
cal leadership, depending on the closeness of the director to the new powers-
that-be. The limited foreign exchange rations given out by the central bank
privilege the state-owned firms and those private ones with close ties to the
government. The sector is therefore not a viable alternative option for wealth
creation outside the ambit of the predatory state and its political groupings.
The bureaucracy not only accumulates wealth through corruption and
perks such as subsidised housing, travel, and so on, but also through high
relative wages. Compared to other African countries, Burundi tops the table
in high wages for a relatively small number of civil servants. One in two hun-
dred of the population work as civil servants and their wages make up
approximately 20% of total government expenditure. The average civil ser-
vant earns 15 times as much as the average Burundian. This seems to run
counter to the argument often made by anti-corruption groups, such as
Transparency International, that corruption is likely to occur when public ser-
vants are badly paid. In the case of Burundi, however, the connection
between a corrupt state machine and high civil service wages lies in the com-
mon prior variable of minority elite control over the state. Access to the state
and the civil service is so restricted to this minority that they have shaped all
aspects of it, including the wage structure, to serve their needs.s9