llG Scarcity and Surfeitmeaningful action on the front of reforming the system of control over
resources.
The second element which reduces the likelihood that the Arusha agree-
ment will be successfully implemented is that the armed Hutu rebel groups
have not been included in the negotiations from the outset, and therefore see
the agreement as illegitimate. This has partly been the reason that there has
been no ceasefire agreement with the rebels, which, in turn, has diminished
the willingness of the Tutsi state authorities to find a security compromise.
After the signing of the peace accord in August 2000, the worst violence
which Burundi has seen for many years broke out, as the rebels protested
against an agreement they did not see as their own.
Third, the international element of the negotiations has been simultane-
ously too directing and too weak. The International Crisis Group criticised
Nelson Mandela, the former chief facilitator, for pushing ahead with the sign-
ing of the accord before the stakeholders were fully agreed. Too much focus
was placed on the accord itself and not enough on the means by which
agreement was reached and the effect this would have on the probability of
its implementation. After 26 months of debate between 17 parties, the gov-
ernment and the National Assembly, which resulted in the main substance of
the agreement, substantial and significant amendments were made in a sin-
gle night's negotiations between two people: Pierre Buyoya, President,
Commander in Chief of the army and leader of UPRONA, and his main polit-
ical adversary Jean Minani, President of FRODEBU and leader of the G7 coali-
tion of Hutu parties. During this night Buyoya demanded "last-minute com-
promises ... in return for his signature the next day."77 The result was an
agreement with highly contested provisions for a transition government,
opening the probability, at best, of endless continuing negotiations, and at
worst, recourse to the military option.
The lack of international engagement with the post-accord details is
shown by the fact that since August 2000 until the recent request by the
South African facilitation team and the transitional government to Tanzania
to help to bring the rebels to the table, there has been very little constructive
movement on this issue. Furthermore, international actors have been reluc-
tant to commit peacekeeping troops to monitor the transition period, result-
ing in an agreement to deploy a South African military protection force dur-
ing October 2001. Finally, the international community has failed to mobilise
significant resources to support Burundi in addressing the humanitarian
crises in the country, including the reintegration of refugees and the demo-
bilisation and reintegration of rebel and militia fighters.
There have been significant domestic and international non-governmental
initiatives, which have been constructively aimed at reconciliation and struc-
tural change. Such initiatives, however, have been largely excluded from the
official peace process. The exclusion of domestic civil society from the peace