140 Scarcity and SurfeitThe logical conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that because
of Burundi coffee farmers' low levels of education and limited access to and
understanding of market information, the largely poor and illiterate coffee
producers of Burundi have required some indoctrination and 'civic educa-
tion' to be aware of their exploitation by the government. In the hope of a
better economic future, the primary producers, whose economic prospects
remain at the mercy of a predatory state, have been stirred to political and in
some cases, armed protest in the vague hope of 'a better tomorrow'.
Nominations to the Coffee and Tea Office, a government parastatal body,
are made by presidential decrees and "... can therefore be used to compen-
sate active party members and supporters for ... services rendered"."2
Consequently, the leadership of this important position has served as a
source of patronage at the political centre, alienating the stakeholders in the
sector's periphery.
The common complaints recorded in many commodity dependent
economies apply to Burundi's coffee subsector: the underpayment of farmers
for their produce, often to the enrichment of a plethora of middlemen and
elite. The close control and regulation of these sectors by the central govern-
ment takes the form of taxes, expense deductions like transportation and
export costs, infrastructure development levies and a host of other deductions
that sometimes leave the primary producer with little more than the input
costs of production and little or no disposable income.
This situation amounts to the appropriation of peasant labour. The eco-
nomic compensation of primary producers is subordinated to the litany of
'expenses' incurred in adding value to the commodity for export on the one
hand and exorbitant charges for inputs by middlemen who act in both direc-
tions on the other.lI3
In the case of Burundi it is observed that
"...The lion's share of the profit from the coffee trade goes to the state
and various intermediaries for which there can be no economic justifi-
cation while the producer receives a little less than 35% [of the export
price] ."l14
This situation is reflective of the broader patronage system that characteris-
es the country's economy. According to the ICG, "the interaction between an
authoritarian regime and the accumulation of economic benefits has been
characterised by the exploitation of the elite of income from primary, agri-
cultural and mining resources."lls.
The overwhelming control the Tutsi elite has on the country has ensured
that the structures for redistribution of national income and wealth in
Burundi revolve around a Tutsi regional network. (In Burundi's political
economy parlance, Mwaro [money], ljenda [technocrats] and Bumri [politi-
cal and military power] complement one another in controlling economic