Oil and Water in Sudan 225areas through 1999. It is reported that between April and July 1999, the pop-
ulation in Ruweng county fell by half. Leonardo Franco, UN Special
Rapporteur, concluded this was a strategy by the government of Sudan to cre
ate "a swath of scorched earth" around the oil fields. According to the
Canadian Assessment Mission, "Over the years, the series of attacks and dis-
placements are leading to a gradual depopulation, as only a percentage of
those who flee return."76 According to the United States Committee for
Refugees, some 55 000 newly displaced peoples fled the oil zone in 2000 and
early 2001.77
Lundin Oil, a Swedish oil company, has a 40% stake in Block 5A.
Allegedly, in order to guarantee the safety of the oil company's operations
and clear an area for a road to the concession, the government waged war
against the local communities, who were forcibly evicted and their villages
razed.78 Likewise. Talisman Energy, a Canadian energy firm, was accused of
allowing Sudanese government defence forces to use the company's airstrip
to launch raids on surrounding villages, in order to secure oil-producing areas
and infrastructure, using government helicopter gun ships and b~rnbers.'~
In 1989, the Bashir government passed the Popular Defence Forces Law,
which provided for paramilitary training and the creation of militias to cany
the jihad against the Christian influence in the south.80 in the regions
of Bahr-al-Ghazal and western Kordofan, the government armed the
Murahaleen, bands of nomadic Arab tribes, forming militias "funded and mil-
itarily deployed by the Sudanese Army" in order to protect its oil conces-
si~ns.~' According to the UN Special Rapporteur to the Human Rights
Commission, "the Murahaleen do not only target rebel camps or armed indi-
viduals, but also civilians, in a very intensive manner. Usually, food crops are
destroyed, men are killed, and women and children are abdu~ted."~~
The government of Sudan also recognised the need to identify southern
allies to fight on their behalf to protect oil-producing areas. To that end, the
NIF exploited the volatile SPLA movement. Under the government's 'Peace
from Within' process, several former SPLA commanders broke with John
Garang and signed a separate agreement with Khartoum in 1997. The agree-
ment promised to give them 75 percent of oil proceeds - a pledge that is still
embodied in the country's constitution. Manipulating the rivalries between
these commanders and John Garang of the SPLA. Bashir offered them high
posts in the government. This strategy was designed to draw their forces onto
the side of the government and establish a buffer zone of NlF-friendly forces
between the SPLA and Benti~?~
The government of Sudan has granted only limited access to humanitari-
an organisations operating in the oil-producing areas, arguably allowing
hunger to complete the 'scorched earth' policy. According to the World Food
Programme, the town of Bentiu experienced a 24% malnutrition rate in 2000.
"Sudanese government officials regularly blocked relief assistance to about