Oil and Water in Sudan 231
western media represents another critical feedback loop into Sudan's con-
flictive conjunction of traditional culture, regional resources, and African-
Arab identities. Journalists' selective focus reminds us that sectarian infor-
mation flows and advocacy interventions often act to reinforce a given con-
flict cycle. There is the example of the Christian organisation, which by sen-
sationalising the revival of slavery in Sudan, attracts financial support for
redeeming African victims. But the cash payments for 'slaves' has increased
the numbers of southerners captured for resale. Such examples of negative
or unintended outcomes alert us to the methodological pitfalls of advocacy.
Most methodologies for managing or resolving conflict nevertheless sub-
sume some form of advocacy. Simply stated, advocacy is pleading the cause
of others; the role of advocate presupposes active engagement.Io1 Advocacy
can be an efficient and effective problem-solving adjunct to developmental
interventions. The record of developmental failures attests to how it can also
reinforce and aggravate problems it intended to resolve. Whiie advocacy has
almost become de rigeur in many developmental contexts, experience high-
lights certain problems latent in the formulation of an advocacy strategy.
Locally based NGO staff, with strong and reliable sources of information,
may be in the best position to activate early warning systems and subsequent
humanitarian interventions. NGOs can take a leadership role in establishing
information flows from local communities or regions on human rights abus-
es, which then serve to activate the international c~mmunity.'~' But the
south's extreme material and political weaknesses, prioritising the delivery
of food and emergency inputs over other forms of developmental interven-
tion, can also contribute to regional and local conflicts in different ways.
The provision of relief food is often a contentious exercise prone to exter-
nal and internal bias and manipulation. This holds equally true for the case
of the government in Khartoum, the rebel movement, and the communities
requiring assistance. Agencies in the north are accused of using food relief as
a lever for proseletisation, but the same is also true for many western church
and relief agencies operating in the south.
This is primarily an OLS conflict management problem at this juncture.
Observations presented in Greathead et allo3 provide a good preliminary
guide to some of the problems arising in connection with the delivery and
distribution of food relief; no doubt other OLS reports and analyses contain
substantial information concerning the issues.
The conflicts engendered by emergency relief led the OLS coordinator to
propose that organisations active in the south adopt the 'working for peace'
theme in 1999. Though widely accepted as a guiding principle for NGO advo-
cacy, apparently it has yet to be translated into a specific policy, or set of poli-
cies.'" The efficacy of any attempt to integrate relief provision and peace
work is obviously a function of coordination among organisational entities
not famous for cooperation either on the ground or at higher levels.