Deegaan Politics and War in Somalia 329in north-eastem Somalia, Somali sentiment and the nature and extent of the
civil war remained unchanged. The limited effectiveness of the EC initiative
was probably due to the fact that it focused on constitutional debates, rather
than on conflict management, and did not include the grass-roots people or
the warring factions.The Djibouti Initiative
President Gelle of Djibouti initiated a long-awaited peace process in
September 1999 when he appealed to Somali leaders and the lnter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states to join him
in addressing Somalia's situation. The Djibouti president hosted a prelimi-
nary conference in Djibouti with over 60 intellectuals to discuss how best to
approach the reconciliation process. He focused on the civil society, the tra-
ditional clan leaders, community elders and prominent political figures from
past Somali governments, and also asked IGAD member states to provide him
the necessary support and back up for the peace process.
The peace process began during May 2000 in Arta, Djibouti with delega-
tions from all corners of Somalia. The discussions continued for over four
months and concluded with the election of a transitional National Assembly
(TNA) of 244 members, an interim president, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan and
a Transitional National Government (TNG) led by interim prime minister, Ali
Khalif Gallayr. The first interim government for Somalia for more than a
decade moved to Mogadishu in September 2000 and was overwhelmingly
received by Mogadishu residents, although its de facto authority was soon to
be restricted to the environs of Mogadishu.
A number of faction leaders have subsequently resisted the TNG and
formed a coalition of opposition groups with a rotating chairmanship called
the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC). The interim gov-
ernment continues to meet resistance because the opposition groups believe
that labelling warlords as criminals and sidelining them prevented them from
participating in and contributing to the peace process. Like the EC initiative.
the Djibouti Initiative delegates focused on institutional and constitutional
solutions to the conflict, instead of reconciliation.
As the security and humanitarian situation continued to deteriorate. IGAD
member states established a technical committee consisting of representatives
from the front-line states of Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia. The mandate
includes monitoring the Somali peace process and drawing up the terms of ref-
erence for the resumption of broad based talks to look at the completion and
implementation of the Arta agreement against a backdrop of public expressions
of disappointment by Hassan at the lack of support from the international com-
munity for the rehabilitation of Somalia as well as the poor progress with the
internal political process, stating that "external interference" in the country's