Leaders 9S
eldom in thefieldofhumanconflictdidsomuchhangon
the whims of one man. Is Vladimir Putin about to invade Uk
raine, as the massing Russian troops on its borders suggest? Or is
he bluffing, to extort concessions from his neighbour and the
West? No one can be sure of Mr Putin’s intentions. Even his own
foreign minister seems to be kept guessing. But, if fighting is
about to break out, the world needs to understand the stakes.
Perhaps Mr Putin is planning a fullscale invasion, with Rus
sian forces thrusting deep into Ukraine to seize the capital, Kyiv,
and overthrow the government. Or he may seek to annex more
territory in eastern Ukraine, carving out a corridor linking Rus
sia with Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula Mr Putin grabbed in- Then again, he may want a small war, in which Russia
“saves” Kremlinbacked separatists in Donbas, an eastern region
of Ukraine, from supposed Ukrainian atrocities—and, at the
same time, degrades Ukraine’s armed forces (see Briefing).
Because Mr Putin has the initiative, it is easy to conclude he
has the advantage. In fact he faces perilous choices. A big war en
tails extraordinary risks. But a smaller war that limits these risks
may fail to halt Ukraine’s Westward drift. And if a small war does
not bring the capitulation of the government in Kyiv, Mr Putin
may ineluctably be drawn into a larger one.
A full Russian invasion would be Europe’s biggest war since
the 1940s, and the first toppling since then of a
democratically elected European government
by a foreign invader. Russians would not only
suffer casualties, especially during a longrun
ning insurgency, but also cause the death of un
told Ukrainians—fellow Slavs, with whom ma
ny have family ties.
Russia would also suffer heavy sanctions. Its
banks would be harshly penalised and its econ
omy deprived of crucial American hightech components. The
ultrarich, including possibly Mr Putin himself, might be pre
vented from spending and saving abroad. Ordinary Russians
would suffer from lower living standards, which have already
been falling over the past seven years.
And the subjugation of Ukraine would come at a strategic
cost to Russia. Every country in its shadow would revise its secu
rity calculations. natowould reinforce the defences of its east
ern members. Sweden and Finland might join the alliance.
For Mr Putin, the economic consequences of war would be
survivable, at least in the short term. His central bank has
$600bn in reserves—more than enough to weather sanctions.
But the political gains in Ukraine could easily be overwhelmed
by setbacks at home which, as Mr Putin knows better than any
one, is where his fate will ultimately be determined.
Perhaps, then, he will start with a less ambitious invasion.
However, a limited war could claim many lives and be hard to
contain. Sanctions might be lighter, but they would still be pain
ful. Russia’s decoupling from the West would still accelerate.
Moreover, if the government in Kyiv remained independent, it
would only redouble its efforts to join the West. Mr Putin’s thug
gery over the past eight years means that even Russianspeakers
in eastern Ukraine no longer hanker for closer ties with Moscow.
Thecomingweekswilldeterminehow Mr Putin chooses, and
nobody should doubt the stakes. Europe faces the prospect of
Russia throttling the flow of piped gas. Even in the absence of a
cutoff, it was expected to spend $1trn on energy in 2022, twice
as much as in 2019 (see Europe section). War would affect the
prices of other commodities, too. Oil is already spiking. Russia is
the world’s largest exporter of wheat, with Ukraine close behind.
Russia is a big source of metals: in today’s tight markets even a
small shock could send commodity prices upwards (see Finance
& economics section).
A successful invasion of Ukraine would also set a destabilis
ing political precedent. The global order has long been but
tressed by the norm that countries do not redraw other coun
tries’ borders by force of arms. When Iraq seized Kuwait in
an international coalition led by America kicked it out. Mr Putin,
who has a nuclear arsenal at his command, has already got away
with annexing Crimea; if he seizes a bigger slice of Ukraine, it is
hard to see him suddenly concluding that the time has come to
make peace with nato.
More likely, he would push on, helped by the newly estab
lished presence of Russian troops in Belarus to probe nato’s col
lectivesecurity pact, under which an attack on one member is
an attack on all. Not only would he relish the chance to hollow
out America’s commitments to Europe, but he
has also come to rely on demonising an enemy
abroad to justify his harsh rule at home.
Other potential aggressors would take note,
too. The likelihood of China invading Taiwan
would surely rise. The regimes in Iran and Syria
would conclude they are freer to use violence
with impunity. If might is right, more of the
world’s disputed borders would be fought over.
With so much at risk, the West should respond in three ways:
deter, keep talking and prepare. To deter Mr Putin, Western pow
ers—especially Germany—should stop equivocating, present a
united front and make clear that they are willing to pay the price
for imposing sanctions on Russia and also to support those Uk
rainians who are ready to resist an occupying army. Meanwhile,
diplomats should keep talking, looking for common ground on,
say, arms control and pressing for a facesaving climbdown that
Mr Putin and his captive media would be free to spin however
they wish. And Europe should prepare for the next crisis by mak
ing clear that its energy transition will cut its dependence on
Russian gas by using storage, diversification and nuclear power.
Seldom has the difference between a country’s interests and
those of its leader been so stark. Russia would benefit from bet
ter, closer, peaceful relations with the West. Such ties would be
available if Mr Putin didn’t behave so abominably. Only he bene
fits from discord, since he can tell Russians they are under siege
and need a strongman to defend them. But even the wiliest
strongman can miscalculate. Invading Ukraine could ultimately
prove Mr Putin’s undoing, if it turns into a bloody quagmire or
makes Russians poorer, angrier and more eager for change. Even
if just for his own sake, he should claim a victory over theimagi
nary threat Russia confronts in Ukraine—and back down.nA war in Ukraine would have terrible consequences, especially for RussiaRussia’s roulette