schemes (only four would be needed for the usually successful children). In
our model, this sets the timetable for acquisition of the idea of having
achieved successful agency between 12 and 26 months (see Table 8.1). The
practical concept of successful agency is different, however, from the motive
of independence. To reach the latter, the child must still reflectively (self 2)
consider that she herself can always (most often) exert successful agency and
thus be independent (self-reliant). This affectively-immediate mental opera-
tion is expressed by the full formula F#2, and requires coordinating (boost-
ing with sensorimotorM-capacity) a total of six or seven schemes. As Table
8.1 shows, this corresponds to the ages of 2 to 3 years, which Oerter (2000)
gave as proper data estimates. The result of this mental operation, when suit-
ably internalized, is a “quasi-need” (as Lewin, 1951, would have called it) that
constitutes the motive of independence.
The Emergence of Specific Interests
Finally, consider the emergence ofspecific interests, which derive from motives
and are the manifestation of more of less enduring affective goals. Specific in-
terests emerge when relevant object-schemes become connected to their affec-
tive goals. This sets theobsin question as suitable targets (i.e.,cognitive goals)
when the affective goals in question are dominant in the organism. Consider-
able neuroscientific research (e.g., Albright et al., 2001; Allman et al., 2001;
Damasio, 1994, 2001; Davidson, 2001; Habib, 2000; Ochsner et al., 2002)
points to the idea that the cingulate gyrus is a main determinant in the dynamic
conversion of motives (i.e., affective goals) into cognitive goals to be pursued
by high cognition, in particular within misleading (cognitive conflict) situa-
tions (van Veen & Carter, 2002), and possibly also in the subsequent develop-
ment of specific interests as enduring cognitive expressions of affective or
cognitive goals. Thus interests (Ainley, Hidi, & Berndorff, 2002; Krapp,
2000; Renninger, Hidi, & Krapp, 1992), when interpreted as personal–emo-
tion schemes, express the conative importance (for stipulated activities) of the
object in question, making it a potential target in cognitive-goal-seeking praxis.
Motives (affective-goal motivations) and interests (specific object-indexed mo-
tivations) are the kernel that educators, parents and psychologists attempt first
to change, whenever a suitableintrinsic motivation(orself-motivation,we dis-
cuss the difference later) is found to be lacking.
Because interest, in a general (nonspecific) sense, is an innate primary af-
fect (Pascual-Leone, 1991), often related to curiosity and novelty (orienting
reactionsand so forth), the expectable mental (M-) demand of specific inter-
est will vary widely with the support (human mediation, mentoring) provided
by family, teachers, and friends. If much suitable support for a given specific
interest (e.g., music, acting) is provided, the specific interest in question will
develop much earlier than described below. This is the case of what we call
hot interests, obtained by way of putting children into a “hot house” life dedi-
220 PASCUAL-LEONE AND JOHNSON