tive^4 overtones, is not new (e.g., Bartlett, 1932). In the early years of the
cognitive revolution, Abelson (1963) challenged cognitive simulation re-
searchers to simulate hot cognition, cognition with an affect or attitude. In
the following sections, we discuss several approaches that treat human beings
as living systems that are capable of higher-order mental functions, not just
pieces of cognitive machinery (Ford, 1992).
Integration of the First Order: Neurobiological
Approaches
Broadly defined, neurobiological approaches attempt to elucidate the biolog-
ical and neuro-chemical substrates of mental processes. As integration ef-
forts, they are concerned with how affect and motivation support or impede
higher mental functions at the brain level. Interestingly, neurobiological ap-
proaches to higher mental functions share similarity with cognitive ap-
proaches in that both deal with mental architecture. However, by reintroduc-
ing biology (the architecture of the brain) into mental affairs, neurobiologists
and neuropsychologists can reinstate emotion and motivation as having a
significant regulatory impact on cognitive processes and serving important
adaptive functions (Damasio, 2001; Edelman, 1989).
As a systematic integration effort, Tucker and Derryberry (1992) pro-
posed that the interaction of cognitive processes of the frontal cortex and
more elementary emotional evaluation (e.g., anxiety) and motivational con-
trol (i.e., regulatory control of attention) provided by limbic and subcortical
structures may be necessary for planning (e.g., sequencing actions, evaluating
significance of events, and future-oriented processing) and self-control (e.g.,
inhibition). They further suggested that recruiting and maintaining an appro-
priate affective edge (i.e., certain levels of arousal) facilitate persistent efforts
in planning and critical analysis. In this vertical integration of brain func-
tions, the limbic system has some regulatory power over the cortical areas, by
narrowing or broadening the breadth of attention and by directing attention
selectively to specific sources of information, for good or ill (Derryberry &
Tucker, 1994), rather than always the other way around (see also Panksepp,
- BEYOND COGNITIVISM 9
4 4 The terms affect and emotion are often used interchangeably, but one can still make a dis-
tinction in terms of their referents. Some argue that affect refers to subjective feelings, without
necessarily being accompanied by autonomic arousal or visceral activity; the latter is often seen
as necessary forrealemotions. Affect also seems to carry more general evaluative overtone, indi-
cating positive and negative valence of transactional experiences with certain situations, while
emotions often refer to more specific reactions to situations vis-à-vis one’s needs and wishes (e.g.,
excitement or frustration). This is why affect is often used more inclusively, encompassing emo-
tion, attitude, and value (see Mandler, 1989a, for a discussion).