integration as it has been developed over the years by one of us (Labouvie-
Vief, 1981, 1982, 1994).
A unique aspect of Piaget’s view of affect is that it rejects any dualism be-
tween affect and cognition but claims that the two are like different sides of
the same coin—that is, Piaget (1980) viewed affect as the dynamic aspect of
cognition, or conversely, cognition as the structural aspect of emotions. That
is, cognition structures the dynamics of emotional experience. As a conse-
quence, as the cognitive system develops, so does the affective system. At the
beginning are hereditary organizations and instinctual drives that provide the
affective base at birth and tie affect to the survival function of the first adap-
tive mechanisms. This view is quite compatible with that of modern emotion
theorists such as Ekman (1984), Izard (1997), or Tomkins (1980) who, fol-
lowing Darwin’s lead, proposed that there are a limited number of basic,
hard-wired, primary emotion systems. According to Piaget (for a summary,
see Labouvie-Vief & DeVoe, 1991), however, these original affect systems
like other sensorimotor schemas become reorganized so as to conserve and
stabilize affect over larger segments of time and space and coordinate it with
other affects. In this way, at the preoperational stage, representation and lan-
guage allow emotions to be manipulated in an internal and imaginary way, as
in symbolic play, when the child can rehearse aspects of experience that seem
frightening. During concrete operations, Piaget (1980) suggested that chil-
dren learn common rules about the socially appropriate display of affect and
show the beginning of feelings concerning morality. The focus on a world of
should is even more pronounced in adolescence when individuals are able to
relate to interpersonal systems of regulation. Individuals invest emotions in
abstract and collective ideals and guide their behavior according to complex
plans that involve wide extension across time and space.
How do relatively simple cognitive-affective structures transform into
complex ones related to complex goals and issues of self and identity? In his
later work, Piaget (1980) extensively outlined such transformations in the
cognitive realm, expanding on his earlier suggestions that transformations
evolve as a result of an interplay of relatively reactive, equilibrium-main-
taining and relatively proactive, equilibrium expanding (or disequilibrating)
strategies. Each of those strategies involves a distinct way of relating to the
world and processing information abstracted from it.
The interplay between equilibration and disequilibration is similar to the
familiar interplay of strategies of assimilation and accommodation. When
the individual functions in an “as usual” modality he or she is at equilib-
rium—reality is structured, from both cognitive and affective perspectives, in
a way that is familiar and self-evident. This self-evidence, to be sure, is not
necessarily a reflective one but can be rather automatic and reactive, inherent
in accustomed-to ways of responding that are integrated into the self. The in-
dividual then functions in an assimilative mode that affirms a reality that is
240 LABOUVIE-VIEF AND GONZÁLEZ