with the frequent notion that developmental transitions can be related to a
degree of distress, instability, and discontinuity. Yet eventually, a new level of
relative stability is reached—as a result of the process of differentiating and
interrelating, knowledge becomes reequilibrated or reintegrated at a new
level. That new level again functions in an affirmative mode—that is, it is ac-
tivated as a totality or integrated unit. However, that new level is more com-
plex than the starting point, since the individual now both can affirm and ne-
gate former knowledge by relating it to a higher-order structure—that is, they
can affirm not only the sameness of volume, but can relate that sameness to
the changes in the separate dimensions. In that way, for example, the con-
crete operational child in the beaker conservation task immediately sees (or
affirms) a constant volume even though its dimensions change; yet, when
asked about the apparent contradiction with perception, the child can resolve
that contradiction by pointing to the compensatory nature of increases–de-
creases in the two dimensions, stating something like “yes, it has become
higher, but at the same time, it has become more narrow.” Such a knowledge
structure, then, is able to create a new organized system of inhibition and fa-
cilitation with the realization that each dimension (e.g., height and width)
places constraints on the other, and the superordinate structure, the volume,
only can be interpreted in the context of their interplay.
The resulting cognitive-affective schemas can be of extraordinary com-
plexity. A good example of such complex cognitive-affective schemas is given
by Kuhn’s (1962) discussion of scientific paradigms, that serve not only a
cognitive function of interpreting available knowledge, but also a social-
emotional function. Thus Kuhn argued that when a paradigm prevails, it also
serves the function of social-affective regulation. Those who adhere to the
paradigm are considered competent or acceptable, while those who reject it
are considered incompetent or even heretic. Less controversially than Kuhn’s
analysis, perhaps, are examples of such cultural symbol and knowledge sys-
tems as religions which bind together not only cognitive insight but also pow-
erful affects (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000).
Limits to Integration
The previous analysis has emphasized the potential for cognitive-affective in-
tegration. However, it is necessary here to add that such integration remains
somewhat of an ideal; in reality, many factors can impede integration. Piaget
(1955, 1962) himself noted this possibility when suggesting that development
sometimes produces an overbalance of one or the other strategies. In the case
of assimilation, this can result in a somewhat egocentric tendency to remain
stuck in a private world, to represent and act so as to suit the self, and to dis-
tort reality to one’s own needs. On the other hand, if there is an overbalance
242 LABOUVIE-VIEF AND GONZÁLEZ