and sciences has also become a research focus (e.g., Goldin, 2000; Gruber,
1995; McLeod, 1989; Thagard, 2002).
Integration of the Third Order:
Phenomenological Approaches
We label the third type of approach as phenomenological because the focus
here is on a person’s subjective, conscious experiences, including bodily sen-
sations and mental images, and other perceptions and cognitions, such as de-
sired outcomes, current concerns, personal epistemologies, intentionality,
and the self. Although emotion, cognition, and motivation are all related to
human consciousness, treating consciousness as a domain par excellence is a
relatively recent event (e.g., Meltzinger, 2000). Ironically, it is mainly philoso-
phers, linguists, and neurobiologists who had attempted an integrated under-
standing of the mind from a first-person perspective (e.g., Edelman, 1989;
Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Polanyi, 1966), before it became a legitimate topic in
the community of psychology (e.g., Apter, 2001; Varela, Thompson, &
Rosch, 1993). The psychological effects of having consciousness and self-
awareness of feelings and emotions are obvious but often get neglected. The
most obvious one is what is called the self-reference effect (Rogers, Kuiper, &
Kirker, 1977; see Symons & Johnson, 1997, for a meta-analysis). When sub-
jects were shown adjectives and asked whether these adjectives described
them, they performed better on ensuing recall tasks. Events that have per-
sonal relevance show distinct patterns of brain activation (i.e., event-related
brain potentials [ERP]; see Johnson, 1986; see also Dweck et al., chap. 2). We
also suspect the involvement of limbic system that enhances the basic func-
tion of memory. However, the ramifications of having consciousness and
self-awareness are much broader and deeper than simple recall.
The Mind–Body Issue Redefined: Embodied Cognition. Discontent with
the classic mind–body dichotomy has been evident at least in philosophy.
Polanyi (1966) challenged the long-held Cartesian position: “Our body is the
ultimate instrument of all out external knowledge, whether intellectual or
practical. In all our waking moments we are relying on our awareness of con-
tacts of our body with things outside for attending to these things” (pp.
15–16). Damasio (2000) framed this argument more formally, “Knowing be-
gins as a feeling because its substrate is built from body signals” (p. 117). In
other words, knowing is a visceral as much as a frontal matter; the feeling of
what happens is just as important as the thought of what happens. Indeed,
the two cannot be completely separated (Neisser, 1963). This establishes, first
and foremost, that knowing is never a completely detached, unperturbed,
pure rational process, but rather a dynamic sense-making that defines an inti-
mate encounter between an enactive person and an impinging environment,
12 DAI AND STERNBERG