activity to the person, decomposing it is difficult, if not impossible (Hidi,
Renninger, & Krapp, chap. 4). However, in Hidi and colleagues’ exposition,
primacy seems to be given to affect rather than cognition, a position consis-
tent with Zajonc (1980). Precisely due to its ambiguous status, the psycholog-
ical nature of interest appears elusive, although its functional significance for
intellectual development is well recognized (e.g., Allport, 1961; Dewey, 1913;
Izard, 1977; Tomkin, 1962). We suggest that interest can be better under-
stood in the context of embodied meaning-making in transactional experi-
ences. We are particularly interested in what Berlyne (1954) called epistemic
curiosity or a desire for knowledge, and what Prenzel (1992) called epistemic
interest. These constructs are closely associated with exploratory behavior,
essential for intellectual development and personal growth. They also pro-
vide clues as to why interest and knowledge have a reciprocal relationship,
and why the depth of knowledge tends to be associated with qualitative
changes in the nature of interest (see Alexander, chap. 10; Tobias, 1994).
Extended Consciousness and Selfhood. Edelman (1989) distinguished be-
tween primary and extended or higher-order consciousness. The extended
consciousness is based, not on ongoing experience, as is primary conscious-
ness, but on the ability to model the past and the future (see also Tulving,
2003). Extended consciousness naturally leads to an important dimension of
intellectual life: personal history. To illustrate the importance of the extended
consciousness and its temporal dimension, think of scientists trying to formu-
late some new theories. Based on a thorough investigation of the evolution of
Einstein’s theory, Holton (1981) argued that what underlies scientific imagi-
nation is not merely some disembodied logic, but rather themes or what he
called themata (e.g., symmetry, continuum, unity). Themata cannot be de-
rived from observation or pure rational thinking, but must grow over time as
deep convictions about the fundamental properties of the universe in the con-
sciousness of individual scientists (e.g., think about Einstein’s comments on
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle: “I shall never believe that God plays dice
with the universe”; Einstein, 1971, p. 91).
Extended consciousness inevitably leads to the phenomenon of the self. To
paraphrase Gazzaniga (2000), we are constantly running an autobiographic
narrative. This is not trivial for intellectual development in that mental stock-
taking is essential for knowledge integration. Damasio (1999), Edelman
(1995), among others (e.g., Zajonc, 1980), suggested the self is shored up not
only by extended consciousness but also by emotion and feeling, a position
reminiscent of James (1997), who described the phenomenal self as a person’s
emotional center. James (1997) commented a century ago that, “All we know
is that there are dead feelings, dead ideas, and cold beliefs, and there are hot,
and live ones; and when one grows hot and alive within us, everything has to
re-crystallize about it” (p. 219). Such recrystallizing has a direct bearing on a
14 DAI AND STERNBERG