inference theory of thinking considered cognitive capacities roughly as a mat-
ter of what we can do in principle. Within the latitude allowed by capacities,
dispositions such as open-mindedness, curiosity, impulsiveness, and dogma-
tism influence what we actually do. Investigators in the field of personality
and social psychology have identified several constructions that bridge be-
tween cognitive ability and thoughtful engagement. These include curiosity
(Maw & Magoon, 1971), the need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 1990)
and the need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982).
Kruglanski identified the need for cognitive closure specifically as “a
dispositional construct... manifested through several different aspects,
namely, desire for predictability, preference for order and structure, discom-
fort with ambiguity, decisiveness, and closed-mindedness” that can influence
one’s thinking performance in the moment (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994, p.
1049). Kruglanski demonstrated that the need for closure is both a trait that
remains fairly stable over time in an individual and a manipulable state that
can be induced by circumstances (Kruglanski & Freund, 1983), thus showing
that ability alone does not account for performance.
Similarly, Cacioppo and Petty advanced (1982) the need for cognition as a
dispositional construct describing an individual’s tendency to seek, engage in,
and enjoy cognitively effortful activity. Their efforts build on the earlier con-
ceptual work of Murray (1938), who developed the notion of a need for un-
derstanding, and Fiske (1949), who examined the idea of an inquiring intel-
lect. According to Cacioppo and colleagues (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, &
Jarvis, 1996), individuals with a high need for cognition do not so much seek
closure and structure as they do understanding. These individuals focus on
the process of making sense of events and stimuli rather than on quickly pro-
ducing tidy theories or explanations. Measures of an individual’s need for
cognition developed by Cacioppo and colleagues have shown that it is a con-
struct distinguishable from ability but highly predictive of performance in
many situations (Cacioppo, et al., 1996).
Drawing on information-processing models of cognition, Stanovich and
West (1997) claimed that cognitive capacities and thinking dispositions “map
onto different levels of analysis in cognitive theory. Variation in cognitive
ability refers to individual difference in the efficiency of processing at the al-
gorithmic level. In contrast, thinking dispositions index individual difference
at the rational level” (p. 9). Their research provides additional evidence that
dispositions are distinguishable from abilities. Using self-report measures of
dogmatism, categorical thinking, openness, counterfactual thinking, super-
stitious thinking, and actively open-minded thinking, Stanovich and West
(1997) found these measures useful in predicting performance on tests of ar-
gument evaluation even after controlling for cognitive capacities.
Dweck and colleagues have investigated another dispositional construct
for a number of years—the contrast between entity learners and incremental
- WHEN IS GOOD THINKING? 357