tion or emotion should be considered in such a system. The global ap-
proaches often consider complex psychological and social organization of in-
tellectual functioning. These approaches often posit hierarchically organized
functioning systems (Demetriou, Kazi, & Georgiou, 1999; Greeno, 2003;
Stanovich, 1999), different levels of functioning, such as operation, action,
and activity (Leont’ev, 1978), multiple-component functioning system (e.g.,
Perkins’s triadic model of thinking; Perkins & Ritchhart, chap. 13; Ford’s
theory of living systems; Ford, 1992). In local integration, traditional concep-
tual foundations often remain intact, although motivation and emotion are
conceptually and empirically infused or reinstated as missing links. In con-
trast, global integration efforts often call for the overhaul of the entire system
of language and the change of the entire way of thinking. One example is to
conceptualize person–situation as an indivisible unit of analysis for the apti-
tude research (see Snow, 1992; see also Lohman, 2001). Similarly, the concep-
tion of distributed intelligence (Pea, 1993), which combines the ecological
psychology of affordances and the motivational theory of desire, challenges
the conventional definition of intelligence as a property of the mind. Also, if
cognition as fundamentally situated, embodied, and cannot be separated
from one’s goals, actions, emotions, and feelings (Bruner, 1994; Glenberg,
1997; Reed, 1997), then the traditional distinction between cognition and
emotion, thinking and action becomes problematic, and the entire concep-
tual edifice starts to crumble. Time will tell whether more modest, local ap-
proaches or more ambitious, global restructuring approaches to integration
will bear more fruition.
To end these concluding thoughts, regardless of whether we will eventu-
ally reach a reunion, a unified psychology that puts it all together in a coher-
ent way, whether the natural and social sciences will find a convergent point
in psychology (Driver-Linn, 2003), we hope that this volume represents a step
in the right direction in the dialectical process of scientific discourse on psy-
chology in general and intellectual functioning in particular.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This work was made possible by a grant from the National Science Founda-
tion (#0296062).
REFERENCES
Abelson, R. P. (1963). Computer simulation of “hot” cognition. In S. S. Tomkins & S. Messick
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New York: Wiley.
EPILOGUE: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 427