minimizing our stock of false ones. Clifford's rule derives its moral validity, one might
contend, from that intellectual goal. And from Clifford's rule flows our duty to believe
only those propositions that enjoy adequate evidential support. James's argument would,
if operative, thwart our intellectual goal by permitting us to violate Clifford's rule.
Can a morally responsible person ever have a moral duty to believe a proposition that
lacks adequate evidence, a duty that outweighs the alleged Cliffordian duty of believing
only those propositions that enjoy adequate support? It seems so. To see this, we must
indulge in a bit of science fiction, and employ what we might call the “ET argument.”
Suppose Clifford is abducted by very powerful and very smart extraterrestrials that
demonstrate their intent and power to destroy the Earth. Moreover, these fiendish ETs
offer but one chance of salvation for humankind: that Clifford acquire and maintain the
belief that the solar system is geocentric and not heliocentric. Clifford adroitly points out
that he cannot just will this belief. The ETs, devilish in their anticipation and in their
technology, provide him with a supply of one-a-day doxastic-producing pills, such that
simply
end p.183
swallowing a pill produces the requisite belief for twenty-four hours. I submit that
Clifford would do no wrong by swallowing the pills and, hence, bringing about and
maintaining belief in a proposition that's much less likely than not. Indeed, Clifford
would be wrong not to swallow the pills. Moreover, because one is never irrational in
doing one's moral duty, not only would Clifford not be immoral, he would not even be
irrational in bringing about and maintaining belief in a geocentric solar system. Given the
distinction between (A) a proposition being rational to believe, and (B) inducing a belief
in that proposition being the rational action to do, it may be that a particular proposition
lacks sufficient evidential warrant, but that forming a belief in that proposition is the
rational action to perform.
One might claim that the ET argument fails because it is valid only if a proposition like
the following is true:
J. If S is morally justified in doing things that will predictably result in her doing x, then
S is morally justified in doing x.^13
But one might argue that (J) is false. For instance, one might allege that the following is a
counterexample to (J):
Suppose an evil and powerful tyrant offers me the following choice: die now, or submit
to an irreversible and irresistible hypnotic suggestion which will cause me to kill myself
five years from now. I have no other option. Surely I am practically [and morally]
justified in submitting to hypnosis in these circumstances. But it would be bizarre to
maintain that five years from now, I am practically [and morally] justified in killing
myself. (Mills 1998, 34–35)
But this is no counterexample to proposition (J). Proposition (J) is specifically about
actions. Irreversible and irresistible events that happen to one are clearly not actions of
that person. In the alleged counterexample, one's killing oneself is not an action, it is a
foreseeable and unavoidable effect of gaining an additional five years of life. Of course,
the failure of this attack on proposition (J) does not entail that (J) is true, but given its
intuitive appeal there's reason to accept it.