For a more extended example, consider the concepts of psychological states that figure in
the motivation of intentional actions. In Alston (1989, chs. 3 and 4), I developed the idea
that functional concepts of psychological states can be univocally applied to God and to
us. For a proper exposition of this, I refer you to the book just mentioned. But the general
idea is that a functional concept is in terms of the function of its object, not in terms of its
structure or intrinsic character. Thus, a loudspeaker is anything with the function of
converting electronic signals into sound; this is compatible with a great variety of
composition and design, as any audio buff can testify. So if we conceive a desire, an
intention, a belief, or a bit of knowledge in terms of its function in the motivation of
action, then that concept can apply to items that are radically different in their
composition and structure, even as radically as the divine psyche differs from the human
psyche.
8. Literal and Metaphorical Speech about God
Thus, partial univocity constitutes one way of walking a tightrope between crude
anthropomorphism (total univocity) and total mystery, abandoning any attempt to make
intelligible and appropriate truth claims about God. But there are nonnegligible reasons
for thinking that it leans too far off the tightrope toward anthropomorphism and does not
take adequate account of divine mystery, the respects in which God is radically other than
human beings and other creatures. Again, our judgment on this will depend on our view
of the divine nature, and that in turn will depend on our attitudes toward the most
important sources of the view of radical otherness. Here I mention only two such sources
and the way they make things difficult for my partial univocity position.
First, consider the person who is, perhaps, the greatest thinker in the Christian tradition,
Saint Thomas Aquinas. For a variety of reasons, both philosophical and theological, he
held that God is absolutely simple. He meant this in the most absolute sense possible.
There are no real distinctions in God between different attributes, faculties, and actions.
There is no real distinction between God and his nature or his nature and his existence.
Aquinas is by no means the only classical Christian theologian to regard God as
absolutely simple, but he gives a particularly uncompromising and trenchant expression
of the doctrine (Summa Theologiae, 1964, pt. I, q. 3). It is not difficult to see how the
doctrine is incompatible with partial univocity. Even if the latter can accommodate divine
immateriality and atemporality, the terms it deems univocal across human and divine
applications are such that in predicating them of God one is committing oneself to real
distinctions between God himself and the property denoted by the predicate. In fact, one
cannot use propositional forms of human discourse (the only forms available to us)
without expressing such distinctions. The only way a form of speech could be perfectly
appropriate to divine simplicity would be to say everything about God all at once with no
division of any kind between aspects of this speech, something that is far beyond human
powers. It is no wonder that Aquinas says
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