application of functional psychological concepts to God represents a bolder claim for the
possibility of literal speech about God. But even if that goes beyond the bounds of
possibility, there are less controversial cases, like the above.
9. Analogical Speech about God
If metaphor doesn't cover the whole field and partial univocity is rejected for unduly
neglecting divine otherness, the only feasible alternative is to find some further way in
which talk of God can use terms literally. But remembering that the only terms we have
are taken from talk of creatures, or derivative therefrom, and if even partial univocity is
ruled out, what possibility is left to apply terms literally to God? A new alternative
emerges once we realize that we can use creaturely terms in their literal senses to speak
of God, while respecting divine otherness, provided we recognize that these terms cannot
be strictly true of God as they stand. But if they are flatly false of God, that will be no
help unless we are to fall back into irreducible metaphor. Hence, the present approach
will have to be that the literal meaning of the terms bear some analogy to what is true of
God, but that we are unable to say explicitly just what the respect(s) of analogy are, for if
we could, we would be back in partial univocity. This position goes under the name of an
analogical use of terms.^3 I will give brief presentations of several versions of the view.
Historically the analogical position is most prominently associated with Saint Thomas
Aquinas. Here is a brief sketch of his treatment (for more details, see Alston 1993). It is
fundamental to Aquinas's theology that “All the perfections of all things are in God”
(1964, pt. I, q. 4, art. 2), and hence that when we deal with what he calls “pure perfection
terms,” those that signify properties that have no limitation to creatures, like goodness,
power, and life (and unlike bodily strength and temporal everlastingness), the properties
in question, if abstractly enough
end p.239
conceived, are common to God and creatures. But still the terms are not completely
univocal, nor can they be analyzed into a part that is and a part that is not, just because of
the point that the “mode” in which the perfections are realized are radically different in
an absolutely simple being like God and composite beings like us. Hence, the upshot is
that in saying things like “God knows everything knowable,” we can be saying something
true because of the likeness between divine and human knowledge, but we cannot make
fully explicit what this likeness amounts to because of the residual inadequacy of all
terms used in discursive speech to represent how it is with an absolutely simple being.
That doesn't mean that the (pure perfection) terms are not used literally, used to attribute
the property their meaning in the language fits them to express. It is, rather, that none of
them succeed in making fully explicit just what we are saying about God.
Thus, Aquinas leaves loose ends dangling in talk about God. He thinks this is inevitable
because of divine simplicity. But there are other versions of the analogy view that do not
accept the divine simplicity doctrine. Here are two examples.