case of the epistemology of religion. But since here is not the place to set about
correcting that defect, I too will focus on beliefs in what follows. And since another
chapter in this book is devoted to “Mysticism and Religious Experience,” I will say very
little about what it is that evokes religious belief.
Developments in Twentieth-Century Religious Epistemology
One important development in twentieth-century religious epistemology has been the
greatly increased sophistication of arguments for both “natural” and “re
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vealed” religion, to use the somewhat misleading terminology of the Enlightenment.
Preeminent has been the work of Richard Swinburne (1979, 1981, 1992, 1996). I myself
judge that the development that will prove of greatest and most enduring historical
significance, however, is the attack that has been launched on the claims made
concerning religion by Enlightenment evidentialism and positivist verificationism.
Accordingly, let me focus my discussion on that development.
A central thesis of the Enlightenment was that religious belief, if it's to be entitled, must
be rationally grounded in the deliverances of reason and experience; the corresponding
thesis of the positivists was that religious discourse, if it's to be used to make assertions,
must be empirically verifiable. Both theses have become untenable. In the writings of
epistemologists one often finds “rational” used as a synonym of “entitled.” Using it thus,
we can put the conclusion that has emerged like this: religious belief does not have to be
rationally grounded to be rational, nor does religious language have to be empirically
verifiable to be assertorically meaningful.
The best-known and most influential movement arguing for the latter conclusion has been
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion; the best-known and most influential arguing for
the former has been so-called Reformed epistemology. Accordingly, it's to these two
movements that I will devote the bulk of my attention, considering them in the order
mentioned. That done, I will conclude by exploring the fascinating convergence between
these two movements, on the one hand, and the attitude toward religion expressed by
Heidegger in some of his writings.
These three bodies of thought emerge from very different philosophical ancestries and get
articulated in very different philosophical styles. Their polemical partners are different:
for Wittgenstein, it's logical positivism; for Reformed epistemology, it's Enlightenment
evidentialism; for Heidegger, it's ontotheology. The understandings they propose as an
alternative to those they attack are likewise different. What makes it nonetheless worth
considering all three together is a fascinating convergence around (at least) two
fundamental points.
Even casual inspection makes plain that few if any religious beliefs are rationally
grounded in the deliverances of reason and experience. The thought of the
Wittgensteinians, of the Reformed epistemologists, and of Heidegger, converges around
the conviction that many of the religious beliefs of many people are nonetheless OK; the
believer is entitled to his or her beliefs even though they're not rationally grounded. There
is in that way an affirmation by all three of the worth of the religion of ordinary people—
an affirmation of the worth of the everyday in the face of contrary claims for the
indispensability of theory.