end p.249
emerged the idea of a religion rationally grounded in the deliverances of reason and
experience. The high medievals, such as Anselm and Aquinas, had the idea of a rationally
grounded theology; it would not be a mistake to see the Enlightenment idea as a
descendent of that medieval idea. But it's a descendent, not the same idea. For theology
was understood by the medieval thinkers as a scientia, a science, a Wissenschaft, whereas
the great Enlightenment figures who talked about religion and articulated the idea of a
rationally grounded religion most definitely did not have the Wissenschaft of theology in
mind. The best indicator of that is this: whereas most people in Locke's day (and ours)
were not theologians, Locke thought that everybody in his society ought to take seriously,
in the way we'll shortly be getting to, the idea of a rationally grounded religion.
Immanuel Kant was considerably less clear than Locke on who was to take seriously the
idea of a rationally grounded religion; it appears to me that it was not the citizenry in
general but the intellectuals of society that he had in mind. That's just a small group
within Locke's citizenry. Even so, the difference from the medieval idea of a rationally
grounded theology is clear: theologians constituted only a small proportion of the
intellectuals in Kant's society; they constitute an even smaller proportion in ours.
Given that Locke was also considerably more clear than Kant on what should be done
with the idea of a rationally grounded religion, not just on who should be doing it, let me
concentrate on presenting his line of thought. An additional reason for concentrating on
Locke is that his thought became far more influential than Kant's in the English-speaking
world.
The topic of chapter 17 of book 4 of John Locke's Essay Concerning Human
Understanding (1975) is “Of Reason”; the topic of the following chapter is “Of Faith and
Reason, and their Distinct Provinces.” With his eye on the topic of the upcoming chapter,
Locke, in concluding chapter 17, observes that there is a “use of the word reason,
wherein it is opposed to faith.” Common though he judged that use of “reason” to be in
his day, Locke thinks it's incorrect; and in any case, it's not, he says, how he will be using
the word. He then concludes the chapter with this rousing passage in which he sums up
one of the principal themes in what has preceded and introduces us to the main theme in
what will follow:
I think it may not be amiss to take notice, that however faith be opposed to reason, faith is
nothing but a firm assent of the mind: which if it be regulated, as is our duty, cannot be
afforded to any thing, but upon good reason; and so cannot be opposite to it. He that
believes, without having any reason for believing, may be in love with his own fancies;
but neither seeks truth as he ought, nor pays the obedience due to his maker, who would
have him use those discerning faculties he has given him, to keep him out of mistake and
error. He that does not this to the best of his power, however he sometimes lights on
truth, is in the right but by chance; and I know not whether the luckiness of the accident
will excuse the irregularity of his proceeding. This at least is certain, that he must be
accountable for whatever mistakes he runs into: whereas he that makes use of the light
and faculties God has given him, and seeks sincerely to discover truth, by those helps and
abilities he has, may have this satisfaction in doing his duty as a rational creature, that
though he should miss truth, he will not miss the reward of it. For he governs his assent