accounts in the Gospels might, historically speaking, be demonstrably false and yet belief
would lose nothing by this; not, however, because it concerns “universal truths of
reason”! Rather, because historical proof (the historical proof-game) is irrelevant to
belief. (Wittgenstein 1980, 32e)
It also follows from the above that the demand of the Enlightenment evidentialists, that
the religious person base his beliefs on evidence, displays a deep misunderstanding of the
nature of religious belief. Suppose that a person who interprets and values food as a gift
utters some such words as “Thank you, God, for this food” as a way of expressing that. In
speaking thus, she is not asserting something for which she ought to have evidence, as
she is not asserting something. As Wittgenstein puts it:
The point is that if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole
businessSuppose, for instance, we knew people who foresaw the future; made forecasts
for years and years ahead; and they described some sort of a Judgement Day. Queerly
enough, even if there were such a thing, and even if it were more convincing than I have
described, belief in this happening wouldn't be at all a religious belief
Here we have people who treat this evidence in a different way. They base things on
evidence which taken in one way would seem exceedingly flimsy. They base enormous
things on this evidence. Am I to say they are unreasonable? I wouldn't call them
unreasonable.
I would say, they are certainly not reasonable, that's obvious.
“Unreasonable” implies, with everyone, rebuke.
I want to say: they don't treat this as a matter of reasonability.
Anyone who reads the Epistles will find it said: not only that it is not reasonable, but that
it is folly.
Not only is it not reasonable, but it doesn't pretend to be
Why shouldn't one form of life culminate in an utterance of belief in a Last Judgement?
But I couldn't either say “Yes” or “No” to the statement that there will be such a thing.
Nor “Perhaps,” nor “I'm not sure.”
It is a statement which may not allow of any such answer. (1966, 56–58)
One might reply by remarking that in this passage Wittgenstein himself suggests that in
religious language games there is talk of “evidence” and of the offering of reasons. How,
then, can he say that it is in principle mistaken for the philosopher to insist on evidence?
The answer of the Wittgensteinian is that the mistake of the philosopher was to require of
the believer what he, the philosopher, has in mind by evidence—namely, evidence for
propositions believed or asserted. It would have been quite another matter if he had been
talking about evidence and reasons as those are understood within religious language
games. There, “reasons look entirely different from normal reasons” (Wittgenstein 1966,
56).
And if the philosopher does understand “evidence” and “reasons” as does the religious
person, then what has to be noted is that it is entirely out of place for the philosopher to
present himself in the role of critic bringing to the ignorant a message concerning the
importance of reasons and evidence. Religious believers already offer reasons for and
against their speaking as they do. They are far from being of the view that “anything
goes” in religion. The history of eucharistic controversy within Christianity makes that
abundantly and painfully clear. Nobody, though, would regard a chemical analysis of the
eucharistic host as relevant to the controversy—though if some scientist claimed that he
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