them from ignorant and barbarous ancestors” (1777, 119, 120). If these strictures were
true, then no contemporary of Hume could be a firsthand witness of a miracle, and
presumably none of us now could be in that position either. So perhaps we would be left
with nothing other than testimonial evidence.
Some Christians agree with Hume that there are no modern miracles. But not all hold that
position, and so these others would not consider themselves restricted to testimonial
evidence. In a curious passage near the end of the essay, Hume himself says that there
were some remarkable miracle reports coming out of Paris in his own time: “The curing
of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were everywhere talked
of[M]any of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of
unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age,
and on the most eminent theatre that is now in the world” (1777, 124). So we might be
allowed to take Hume's earlier comments about the ignorant and barbarous origin of all
miracle stories with a grain of salt.
However that may be, many of us will think that, at least for alleged miracles that are
remote in time, such as those of Jesus, testimonial accounts will often be important
elements in establishing the reality of the miracle.
Hume apparently thought that human testimony could not perform that role. But this is
not because Hume had a general skepticism about testimony, for he
end p.313
says, “There is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary
to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of
eye-witnesses and spectators” (1777, 111).
Despite this high opinion of the value of testimony in reasoning about most affairs,
however, Hume clearly thinks that it fails utterly with respect to miracles. Why is that?
Well, his argument appeals essentially to a comparison of probabilities:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience
has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is
as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imaginedIt is no miracle that a
man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death,
though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is
a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in
any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every
miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation
The plain consequence is (and it is a general maxim worthy of our attention), “that no
testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that
its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavors to establish”
When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life I immediately consider
with myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be
deceived, or that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one
miracle against the other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce
my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. (1777, 114–16)
In this text Hume uses an unfortunate terminology. Sometimes he uses the word
“miracle” and its cognates without any comparative adjectives. I understand him to be