grasp truths that they would have no access to apart from a revelation. Nevertheless, faith
for Locke must always be governed by reason.
Locke accepts two common epistemological claims.^2 First, being a classical
foundationalist, he holds that all of our beliefs must rest on a foundation of propositions
that are known with certainty. Second, being an evidentialist, he holds that the beliefs that
are held on the basis of this evidential foundation must be held with a strength that is
proportionate to the evidence that the believer has for them (1975, 697). For Locke,
humans have a duty to believe only what is supported by evidence that ultimately traces
to foundational certitude, and they have a duty to hold those beliefs with a degree of
assurance that corresponds to the evidence.
For Locke, it is certain that any proposition revealed by God is true. However, that any
particular revelation is in fact from God is itself a belief for which a person must have
evidence; it is not itself something that could be known with certitude. It follows that “no
Proposition can be received for Divine Revelationif it be contradictory to our clear
intuitive Knowledge” (1975, 692, emphasis Locke's). So reason must certify the
credentials of any alleged revelation, and no alleged revelation can overturn the
foundational truths known by reason. Locke does, however, accept that a well-attested
revelation might overturn a belief that is merely probable for reason (694–96). He
concludes that faith is simply “natural Reason enlarged by a new set of Discoveries
communicated by god immediately, which Reason vouches the truth of” (698).
The fideist view is more difficult to describe than the rationalist perspective, partly
because the term is often used as a term of abuse, a close cousin of irrationalism. When
the term is used in this way, it is understandable that few thinkers
end p.332
would be willing to own the label. Perhaps the clearest example of one who embraces this
kind of irrationalism is the Russian expatriate Lev Shestov, who seems to affirm that
there is indeed a contradiction between human reason and religious faith, and concludes
that the believer must choose faith, even if this means he or she must reject the principles
of logic (1966, 302). Most of the thinkers who have been labeled irrationalists because
they are fideists, however, such as Kierkegaard and Tertullian, do not really seem to wish
to reject reason, though particular passages quoted out of context may appear to suggest
that they do.
A fideist who really does wish to reject reason in the form of the principles of logic is
committed to a view that cannot be rationally defended or even discussed, since we
cannot understand what someone might mean by an assertion if that assertion is
compatible with its denial being true. I shall therefore ignore views such as Shestov's.
However, the indefensibility of irrationalism should not blind us to the possibility that
there are defensible claims made by some of the thinkers who have been described as
fideists. The question as to whether a particular individual should or should not be
described as a fideist is not that interesting, I believe. It is more important to look at the
claims made by people who have been accused of being fideists. I suggest that the
primary defensible claims center around the idea of the limits of human reason.
That human reason has limits of various kinds seems undeniable, and the recognition of
such limits is hardly irrational. For example, science fiction has made commonplace the