accepted by a given society as reasonable, then we can understand the possibility that a
critique of concrete reason may be done for the sake of ideal reason.
A good example of what we might call the critique of what counts as “reason” (in the
concrete sense) is provided by some contemporary feminists, who argue that many of the
practices accepted as “reasonable” reflect a male bias rooted in male domination of
society. A society characterized by true equality between men and women and in which
women were full participants might therefore have a somewhat different conception of
what is reasonable or rational. One does not have to accept the conclusions of these
feminists to see that the kind of case they are making is one that a truly reasonable person
must be open to considering. In effect, feminists have argued that male bias and
domination of society constitute a condition that damages or limits concrete reason.
One way of construing thinkers such as Kierkegaard is to see them as making a similar
claim. On this view, reason may not be limited merely by its finitude, as was mainly the
case when we looked at faith as involving beliefs that are above reason, but by the
character of concrete human beings. Suppose that some religious view of the world is
true, but that the intellectual practices designated as “reasonable” in a given society are
such that it is difficult or impossible to recognize this truth. For example, suppose the
Buddhist claim that suffering is linked to desire is true, but that in a given society the idea
that desire is something bad or defective just seems “self-evidently” false to most people,
a view that a “rational” person would not consider seriously. Perhaps a person who is in
such a condition can come to see the truth only if his or her character is transformed
through some ascetic practice or through meditation.
For Kierkegaard and other Christian thinkers who have been termed fideists, the relevant
damage to reason is due to human sinfulness. An integral part of classical Christian
doctrine is the claim that the human race possesses a kind of “solidarity in sin,” a strong
orientation away from God and God's goodwill, and that it is only with divine assistance
that humans are capable of reorienting themselves toward the good. This Christian claim
is one way of spelling out what is involved in the no-neutrality thesis considered above, a
big part of the reason why evidential common ground might be limited when it comes to
the discovery of religious truth.
How might sin cause such damage to reason? Traditionally, sin has been conceived as
centering on either pride or selfishness (or perhaps both). Pride might
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damage a human's ability to know God, because the recognition of God demands
humility. I cannot see myself as the center of the universe if I know that God is the
Creator of all things and that I am a completely dependent creature. Selfishness might be
a barrier, if God is love, as many religions claim, and if there is truth in the ancient
principle that “only like knows like.” Perhaps a selfish, acquisitive creature has difficulty
recognizing and accepting love. If humans are responsible to God, and if God demands
loving concern for others, then we can certainly see that selfish creatures would have
motivation for suppressing or denying any knowledge of God.
In this context, “faith” might be considered the name for the new condition that is made
possible by God's help. Faith is not merely believing without evidence, or even believing
what is above reason, though it may be both of those as well. Faith requires a