whereas the concept of moral wrong serves the same function in secularized moral theory
as sin does in the moral systems of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, the concepts of sin
and moral wrong are not the same. The former is a rich concept that makes no sense
outside the context of personal and communal relationships, defined in part by narratives,
and sometimes involving elaborate theological accounts. In contrast, the latter is a thin
concept intended to be the common denominator in a set of concepts used by atheists,
Jews, Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians, and others.
end p.346
All can understand the idea of doing what is wrong even though many believe that every
act of wrongdoing is more than mere wrongdoing. We should be wary, then, of the idea
that when the Christian speaks of “sin” and the nonreligious person speaks of “moral
wrong,” they are talking about the same thing. It is not just a matter of the Christian
having distinctive beliefs about the implications and consequences of wrongful acts. I am
suggesting that the concept of sin and the concept of moral wrong are different concepts,
although they are not disjoint, and Christians or Jews are able to understand what is
meant by moral wrong because of their ability to understand discourse outside their
religious community and the extent to which it overlaps with their own. There are
concepts analogous to sin in other religions, such as avidya (ignorance) in the nontheistic
Advaita Vedanta. Avidya is a kind of ignorance that involves desiring, feeling, and
choosing wrongly as well as thinking wrongly. If I am right in this conjecture, the idea of
moral wrong is thinner than the parallel concepts in religious moralities, but it has the
advantage of permitting discourse across religious divisions as well as with people who
do not find a home in any religion.
The same point applies to concepts for the goal of morality, concepts of salvation,
enlightenment, or Aristotle's eudaimonia. These concepts also have something in
common even though they are distinct. All apply to the goal of living morally. The idea
of an ultimate moral goal, like the idea of moral wrongdoing, is a common denominator
among a wide range of religious moralities as well as some, like Aristotle's, that are
metaphysically rich but not religious. Sometimes the idea of happiness is taken as the
equivalent for the idea of the moral goal. The thinnest concept of happiness is identified
by Aristotle at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics (2000; hereafter NE); it is simply
the concept of what all humans ultimately aim at. This concept can be thickened by a
description of the content of the goal, and Aristotle's concept of eudaimonia is gradually
thickened in the course of book 1 of the NE, and throughout the rest of the work.
Religious discourse almost always begins with a thick concept of the goal of human life,
often called salvation. Salvation can be interpreted as a thickening of the goal identified
by Aristotle on the first page of the NE, although in a different direction. So, just as sin
adds to wrongdoing the idea of offending God, salvation adds to happiness the idea of
existing in union with God, or recognizing one's identity with the Brahman, or realizing
one's Buddha-nature.
Clearly, the thinning of religious concepts like sin and salvation into nonreligious moral
concepts like wrongdoing and happiness is an advantage in a pluralistic society, but one
of the consequences of thinning religious moral concepts is that it results in concepts that
are so abstract, it is unclear that they are able to motivate an agent in her practical life.