views on the role of more subtle deformations or sins. The second concerns their position
on the principle that to know the good is to do the good. The third concerns their notion
of what is involved in changing acquired inclinations” (90). Let us briefly examine each
of these topics.
On the issue of subtle deformations, Aquinas is particularly attentive to subtle sins such
as envy and vanity because they distort the higher human capacities and so are likely to
corrupt the whole personality. Mencius, by contrast, tends to focus on tendencies to vice
that arise largely from bodily appetites, that is, matters that Aquinas would regard as
instances of lust or gluttony. When Mencius does treat more subtle deformations, he is
apt to regard them as if they resembled those found in the cruder cases that are his
paradigms.
The principle that to know the good is to do the good is endorsed by both Mencius and
Aquinas. However, Aquinas differs from Mencius because he often discusses cases from
his own tradition that challenge or cast doubt on the principle. Yearley calls attention to
three such cases:
One especially powerful example is St. Paul's statement in Romans that he cannot do the
good he would do or avoid the bad he would avoid. Another is Augustine's depiction in
the second book of the Confessions of an action, his theft of pears, that seems explainable
to him only as an attempt to act against all possible goods. A third is the general
phenomenon that spiritual apathy
end p.414
(acedia) describes, a state first identified by the desert fathers and a familiar feature of the
monastic life. (1990, 92)
Mencius, on the other hand, considers fewer examples in tension with the principle, and
he repeatedly insists that knowledge of the good will always issue in good action and
character. It is striking that both Yearley and Van Norden emphasize the importance of
the example of Augustine's theft of the pears in reflections on moral evil within the
Christian tradition and make use of that example in their comparisons with Mencius.
On the topic of changing acquired inclinations, Aquinas holds the pessimistic view that
humans are oriented toward vicious rather than virtuous states or, at best, turned toward a
mixture of vicious and virtuous states, and cannot reorient themselves under their own
power. He therefore invokes a transcendent power to reorient us and insists that only
divine grace can save us from sin. Mencius usually adopts the more optimistic position
that people are always capable of becoming good under their own power, though he
sometimes mentions aids to improvement such as forms of virtuous leadership (te),
psychophysical energy (ch'i), and being raised in a good society. Yearley summarizes the
difference as follows:
When Mencius speaks in his most voluntaristic fashion and claims we can reorient
ourselves just by refocusing our attention, he differs fundamentally from Aquinas. When
Mencius speaks in a less voluntaristic vein, however, he moves closer to Aquinas's
position that only a separate power can rescue individuals from the destructive circle they
inhabit. But even when Mencius speaks this way he usually asserts that human forces (if
ones that draw on other powers) can affect the needed changes. Aquinas, in contrast,
believes all human efforts are too corrupt to produce all the changes needed. (1990, 95)