argument, but he considers that “this old argument for the existence of God is far better
than most philosophers of the modern period have thought it to be” (1998, xi). A version
of the argument that does not appeal to the principle of sufficient reason is given by
Richard Swinburne in The Existence of God (1979). Swinburne's claim is that the
existence of a complex physical universe is more comprehensible if it is taken to be
created by God than if it is an unexplained, brute fact. William Lane Craig (1979) has
been active in promoting the Kalam cosmological argument, which contends on both
logical and scientific grounds that the universe cannot always have existed and points to
an intelligent personal cause as the source of its coming into existence.
The design argument has been under a cloud, not only because of Hume's rhetorically
masterful critique, but because Darwinian evolution has undermined the most popular
version of the argument, based on the adaptedness of living
end p.429
creatures. Hume's objections have been effectively challenged, but the task of refuting
Darwin as a prologue to constructing a design argument has not appealed to philosophers.
Richard Swinburne (1979), however, has put forth a version of the argument based on the
existence of natural regularities, contending that these are better explained through the
operation of an intelligent cause than accepted as mere brute facts. More recently, John
Leslie (1989), along with others, has promoted a design argument based on the “fine-
tuning” of the fundamental physical constants of the universe. The values of these
constants are held to stand in need of explanation, because if they were even very slightly
different (as they well might be), our cosmos would be such as to make intelligent life
impossible.
What standards should these arguments be expected to meet? The claim that has
traditionally been made for them is that they are, or should be, convincing to any rational
person: the premises are propositions that are (or can become) evident to anyone who
examines the matter, and the conclusions follow from the premises by reasoning whose
validity is likewise evident to any competent reasoner. Unfortunately, by this standard
there are virtually no successful arguments in all of philosophy (none, at least, that
establish interesting positive conclusions; some refutations may meet the test). George
Mavrodes (1970), however, has pointed out that the success of arguments is in many
cases “person-relative”: that there are arguments that are convincing for some person, and
actually enable that person to know the truth about some matter, and yet those same
arguments fail for other, equally intelligent persons. This may be so because of
differences in background knowledge, training, and experience, or because of personal
experiences that cannot be fully communicated to someone who has not had them.
Furthermore, predispositions and value orientations greatly affect the plausibility of
beliefs and arguments for a person (see Wainwright 1995), and such factors are not
readily altered by reasoning.
All of this may come as a disappointment to those who still cherish the Enlightenment
ideal of a single, neutral philosophical reason that will place us securely in possession of
the truth about all important matters. But it is as clear as anything can be that this ideal is
unattainable in human life, and recognizing this fact enables us to consider philosophical
arguments, such as the arguments for the existence of God, without setting impossibly