accepted and incorporated by others. But there are also differences of principle that
cannot easily be reconciled.
There is no reason why analytic philosophy should not be open to the concerns and
emphases of feminism, and a number of analytic philosophers consider themselves
feminists or friends of feminism. However, analytic philosophers will tend to reject the
idea that one's philosophical work as a whole ought to be dominated by a particular
ideological agenda such as feminism. Postmodernism is a large and varied category, and
responses to it from analytic philosophers will vary accordingly. To the extent that
postmodernism is antirealist and considers the meaning of texts to be systematically
indeterminate, it will be rejected by analytic philosophers, including philosophers of
religion. On the other hand, understanding of the social location of particular
philosophies and movements of thought can be extremely valuable, and there is
sometimes need for a “hermeneutic of suspicion.” But a hermeneutic of suspicion must
be preceded and enveloped by a hermeneutic of trust, which takes the utterances and
writings of others at face value and assesses them on their merits. Few things are so
destructive of dialogue as to disqualify the statements of one's potential partners in
advance of any serious consideration of their merits.
One would think that Wittgensteinian and analytic philosophies of religion should have
much in common, and to some extent this is so. But insofar as prominent
Wittgensteinians reject metaphysical realism, most analytic philosophers will demur. The
Wittgensteinians do not, to be sure, think metaphysical realism is false, but rather that it
is hopelessly confused and lacking in definite meaning. This question should in principle
be amenable to argument, but hopes for an early resolution do not run high. Nothing,
however, prevents analytic philosophers from appropriating Wittgensteinian insights and
techniques. William Alston's Perceiving God (1991), to take a single example, makes
extensive use of Wittgenstein in defending the claim that God is perceived in religious
experience.
The comparison of analytic philosophy of religion with Thomism is particularly
interesting. Clearly, there is a great deal of overlap between the two, both in the topics
addressed and in the general style of treatment. The response of analytic philosophers to
Thomism, however, depends on how Thomism is understood. The mainstream of modern
Thomism, stemming from the encyclical
end p.441
Aeterni Patris issued in 1879 by Pope Leo XIII, tended to take Thomas's achievements as
the foundation for all philosophical reflection. Thomistic categories were adapted and
applied to modern circumstances, but both the fundamental assumptions and the technical
philosophical apparatus remained conspicuously medieval. More recent philosophy was
regarded largely as an aberration that needed to be put aside or refuted in order to recover
the sanity, balance, and wisdom of the Angelic Doctor. To the extent that these attitudes
persist, analytic philosophers find discussion with Thomists frustrating and unprofitable.
But there is another way Thomism can be understood, and on this reading it is perfectly
feasible to be both an analytic philosopher and a Thomist. Thomists of this stripe think
Aquinas was mostly right about a great many things, but they are willing to translate his
insights into a more contemporary idiom. They also criticize, modify, and even on