Blaise Pascal argued that although the evidence for the truth of the Christian religion is
ambiguous, it is sufficient to convince those who seek God or “have the living faith in
their hearts.” Reflection on the work of predecessors like these suggests two things. The
first is that the aim of philosophical theology is not, primarily, to convince nonbelievers
of the truth of religious claims but, rather, self-understanding: to enable the believer to
grasp the implications of, and reasons for, his or her religious beliefs. The project, in
other words, is faith in search of understanding. The second is that a person's attitudes,
feelings, emotions, and aims have an important bearing on his or her ability to discern
religious truths. C. Stephen Evans, for example, has suggested that faith may be a
necessary condition of appreciating certain reasons for religious belief. I have argued that
a properly disposed heart may be needed to grasp the force of evidence for theistic
belief.^4 Common to much recent religious epistemology is a rejection of any form of
evidentialism that insists that religious beliefs are reasonably held only if they are
supported by evidence that would convince any fair-minded, properly informed, and
intelligent person regardless of the state of his or her heart (see chapters 10 and 13).
As its history indicates, the aims of philosophers of religion can be quite diverse.
Arguments are sometimes employed apologetically. For example, Samuel Clarke and
William Paley attempted to construct proofs that would convince any fair-minded and
intelligent reader of God's existence and providential government of human affairs. These
proofs had begun to lose their power to persuade educated audiences by the end of the
eighteenth century, however, and so Friedrich Schleiermacher and others turned to
religious feelings (a sense of absolute dependence or of the unity of all things in the
infinite) to justify religion to its “cultured despisers.” But although Schleiermacher
thought that the heart and not the head is religion's primary source, the aim of his
argument was still apologetic.
Yet philosophy of religion can have other purposes. Theistic proofs, for example, have
been used to persuade nonbelievers of the truth of theism. But, as we have seen, they can
also be used devotionally, and this is sometimes their
end p.
primary purpose. Thus, Udayana's Nyayakusumanjali (which can be roughly translated as
“A bouquet of arguments offered to God”) has three purposes: to convince unbelievers, to
strengthen the faithful, but also to please Siva “by presenting it as an offering at his
footstool.” Regardless of the success Udayana's arguments may or may not have had in
achieving his first two goals, they have value as a gift offered to God; their construction
and presentation is an act of worship.^5
Philosophy of religion is sometimes part of a larger philosophical project. For example,
for Hegel, religion is the self-representation of Absolute Spirit in feeling and images. As
such, it is a stage in a historical process that culminates in philosophy (i.e., in Hegel's
philosophy!). Descartes provides another example. His Meditations introduce ontological
arguments for God's existence to help resolve skeptical doubts raised earlier in the text
(see chapter 4).
Philosophy of religion can also be part of the so-called Enlightenment project. Religious
beliefs, institutions, and practices are critically examined in an attempt to eliminate those
that can't survive the scrutiny of impartial reason. Hume's Dialogues and The Natural