possible being, possibly someone or other nondivine refers to it. If that's so, then possibly
something is greater than x only if possibly someone refers to that greater thing. If so, we
can simplify our account of a G, for being a G is equivalent to being something than
which there can be no greater. From now on, let's take Anselm to be talking of this
property.
In Proslogion 5, Anselm reasons that unless it is to be less than we can think it to be, a G
must be “whatever it is better to be than not to be” (Charlesworth 1965, 120), that is, have
every attribute F such that having F is better than lacking F. Now if something had every
such attribute, it would be a G (a G being one thing it is better to be than not to be). So if
something is not a G, it lacks some F a G has, such that having this F is better than
lacking F. Thus, Proslogion 5 implies that a G is greater than any possible non-G in at
least one respect. Further, there is no respect in which a non-G surpasses a G: if a non-G
has some attribute it is better to have than to lack, any G has this too, and only such
attributes are respects in which something might surpass a G.^3 So overall, any G is
greater than any non-G. As it's obvious that nothing in the material world is a G, we can
infer that a G must at least be greater than any actual material object—including the
universe. Here is a particularly impressive attribute: being greater than every other
possible being in some respect and equaled by no other possible being in any respect.
Such a G would be a most perfect possible being. Anselm would almost certainly hold
that a G must be a most perfect possible being: if a G were not so, we could apparently
think of a greater, namely one that was so. But his argument doesn't make use of this
description.
Talk of Gs naturally raises questions like What is greatness? or Greater in what way?
Anselm doesn't answer. But he clearly means greatness or being greater to be or involve
some sort of value-property the God of Western theism has supremely. So Findlay's
(1955) suggestion that we take these in terms of worthiness of worship can't be too far off
the mark: let's say that greatness is either desert of worship or some combination of
attributes on which this supervenes.^4 As it turns out, we needn't be more specific than
this.
In Proslogion 4, Anselm asserts that
Df. God = that than which no greater can be thought,
the definite description implying that there is just one G. Anselm nowhere argues that
there is just one. And this is not obvious. Something without a greater might nonetheless
have an equal. If Anselm cannot rule it out that there could be two or more equal Gs, he
faces a problem. For his argument will apply to as many possible Gs as there are, prima
facie, and so if it works will prove that there are
end p.82
many Gs. If there are, the definite description “that than which no greater” will not
refer—in which case, Anselm's argument will prove that God does not exist, given (Df).
Why just one possible G? One can only speculate:
i. Anselm argues that being a G entails being intrinsically simple, that is, not having
distinct purely intrinsic attributes (Proslogion 12; see Monologion 16–17). Suppose that
this is so. For any x, being x is intrinsic to x: it is a matter settled entirely within x's
boundaries, so to speak. Being simple is also intrinsic. So for any x, if x is simple, being