can or could have, parallel arguments from perfection will work for all possible Gods,
yielding more Gods than monotheists want. So Anselm needs to show that
NO. There cannot in one possible world be two instances of deity.
One good argument for (NO) stems from a claim argued earlier, that a G must account
for the existence of all good things with which it coexists. Gs are good things. So were
there two Gs at once, each would have to account for the other's existence. Because ——
accounts for ——'s existence is a transitive relation, this would entail that each accounts
for its own existence. But this is impossible. Again, we saw earlier that a G's contribution
must be both sufficient and necessary for the existence of all good things with which it
coexists. If so, there cannot be two Gs at once. For suppose that A and B each suffice on
their own for C's existence. Then without B's contribution, C could still exist, if A were
still making its contribution. But then it's false that B's contribution is necessary for C's
existence.
(NO) is true, and so multiple-G parodies are ruled out. So let's consider parodies via
almost-Gods, deities whose only greater is God. Let's call one such being Zod, and say
that Zod is just like God save for a slight difference in perfection we cannot conceive.
Zod is to us indiscernible from God. But Zod cannot coexist with God. For God is
uncreatable and has made everything other than Himself, and Zod would duplicate Him
in these respects. And so we cannot accept arguments for both Zod and God. But we
might read “a G” as “an almost-God than whom no greater can be thought”—describing a
being whose only greater is God, who is not an almost-God. If Anselm can't explain why
we should accept (1) and (2) on his reading of them but not on a parody-reading, we
ought not assent to them on either reading. Further, if God is a necessary being, so is Zod.
So given a modal logic including Brouwer, it's not the case both that Zod and that God
possibly exist.^8 But if we can't tell Zod from God, how could we have reason to think one
but not the other possible? Thus, parody yields reason to be agnostic about such claims as
that being a G is possibly exemplified.
Almost-Gods threaten to multiply: perhaps for any particular degree of likeness to God,
an almost-God like Him to that degree would be more worship-worthy if it existed than if
it were merely possible. Whether it would, though, depends on what worship is. At least
within Western monotheism, whose concept of worship Anselm presumably had in mind,
worship is or includes praise without qualification or limit. What deserves only qualified
or limited praise thus does not deserve worship. And anything that can have a superior
can deserve only qualified or limited praise. It is great—but there can be a greater, and so
its praise
end p.93
ought to be qualified accordingly. “O god, you are great—but there can be greater”: this
does not sound like worship. If it isn't, and yet someone surpassable can deserve no more,
nobody surpassable can deserve worship. Nothing can unless it has no possible greater
simpliciter. And now here's the rub: an almost-God has no possible greater simpliciter
only if it isn't possible that there be an Anselmian G. For as we've seen, a G is greater
overall than any other possible being. If a G is possible, then, no almost-God can deserve
worship, and so none can be more worship-worthy if actual. And so if a G is possible,
one can dismiss this sort of parody—any reason to think a G possible gives one reason