analytic, say, or feminist). In being critical, the chapters carefully assess the views
presented on their topics or the strengths and alleged weakness of their approach to the
philosophy of religion. Readers will thus see not only what the prominent views and
approaches in philosophy of religion are but encounter noteworthy criticisms of them as
well. In being representative of a distinctive viewpoint the chapters present their authors'
own views on the topic or approach. Readers will thereby encounter not only exposition
and criticism but the substantial development of a viewpoint on the subject under
discussion by a well-known author in the discipline. Finally, in addition to exposition,
criticism, and original philosophical development, each chapter includes topical
bibliographies identifying key works in the field. It is our hope that the Handbook's
combination of topical and methodological comprehensiveness, criticism, and original
philosophical development will provide the reader with a unique and invaluable reference
work on the philosophy of religion.
NOTES
1.John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), 42, 50–51,
27.
2.See Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), and Robert Oakes, “Creation as Theodicy: A
Defense of a Kabbalistic Approach to Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 14 (1997): 510–21.
For attempts to offer theistic accounts of natural laws, mathematical objects, and moral
claims see, e.g., Del Ratzsch, “Nomo(theo)logical Necessity,” and Christopher Menzel,
“Theism, Platonism, and the Metaphysics of Mathematics,” both in Christian Theism and
the Problems of Philosophy, ed. Michael D. Beaty (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1990), 184–207 and 208–29, respectively; Philip L. Quinn, Divine
Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); and Robert M.
Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
3.See Marilyn McCord Adams, “Praying the Proslogion: Anselm's Theological Method,”
in The Rationality of Belief and the Plurality of Faith, ed. Thomas D. Senor (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995), 13–39.
4.See C. Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard's
Philosophical Fragments (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), and William J.
Wainwright, Reason and the Heart (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).
5.John Clayton, “Piety and the Proofs,” Religious Studies 26 (1990): 19–42.
6.It should be noted, however, that, on the Visistadvaitin view, bodies are absolutely
dependent on souls although souls are not dependent on bodies. So the differences
between the two views should not be exaggerated. See William J. Wainwright,
Philosophy of Religion, 2d edition (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1998), 192–96.
7.Merold Westphal, “Traditional Theism, the AAR and the APA,” in God, Philosophy,
and Academic Culture, ed. William J. Wainwright (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), 21–
27.
end p.