NOTES
1.Leibniz's argument, for instance, reasons simply from the claim that God is a necessary
being (see below). But the latter rests on the claims that necessary existence is a
perfection and that God is a perfect being.
2.Nobody nondivine is clumsy but necessary. Proslogion 15 asserts that God is
end p.111
greater than can be thought, using the same language involved in a G. Anselm could not
mean to say that God is too great to be thought of or described simpliciter, since he surely
thinks that God thinks of Himself. So he must mean a G in terms of thinkers other than
God. But Anselm wouldn't want to read a G simply in terms of what we can describe or
refer to, for he believes in angels, and surely he'd hold that God is too great for angels as
well as humans to describe adequately. Still, since “nobody nondivine” is clumsy, I
henceforth replace it with “we.”
3.If it is better to lack than to have F—that is, if F is an imperfection—then it is better to
have than to lack ¬F, and so a G has ¬F. So a G has no imperfections. So nothing could
surpass a G by surpassing one of its imperfections. If an attribute is neither a perfection
nor an imperfection—neither raises nor lowers greatness—it's hard to see how it could be
a respect in which one being could surpass another. For if being F makes A greater than
G, presumably being F raises A's greatness past B's.
4.Oppy (1995) suggests that we need reason to think that a G, if actual, would be “a being
of religious significance” since there may well be numbers too great (large) for us to
“form a positive conception of” (16). Agreed. The only nonlogical vocabulary in “a G” is
“thought of” and “greater.” Since no religious significance attaches to the first, the
second must provide some. The Findlay suggestion in effect stipulates that it does. And
why not?
5.Anselm's argument requires that understanding “the G” puts one in cognitive relation to
an entity, the G, which then “exists in intellectu.” On this general approach,
understanding “Santa Claus” puts one in cognitive relation with Santa Claus. Santa Claus
then is the object of one's thought. But Santa Claus does not exist.
6.But see also p. 68, where Oppy (1995) seems to waver.
7.Can there also always be another being a bit better than any being we pick (Oppy 1995,
19)? We have the concept of God, which has a number of notes and is supposed in virtue
of them to be a concept of the greatest possible being. And we find this connection
intuitive: it's pretty hard to think of something better than being necessary, omnipotent,
omniscient, morally perfect, and so on. So if one can show it possible that God exist, one
can answer the question no. Those who offer arguments from perfection must show that
this is possible anyway. So “Is it the case that for any possible being, there is always a
greater?” adds nothing to their argumentative task. Moreover, —— is a greatest possible
island wears its unsatisfiability on its sleeve. —— is a greatest possible being does not, if
only because we're less clear on what makes beings as such “great,” or what greatness is
in beings. Further, on the reading of greatness I've suggested, it turns out trivially true
that God is the greatest being possible, if God possibly exists.